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It is by now a cliche to suggest that the United States Court of  Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has vl'eakened the standards for obtaining patents. In this 
Article, we empirically assess that court's pe1jormance on the ultimate question 
of patentability-the requirement that a patentable invention must be 
"nonobvious." Our findings suggest that the conventional wisdom may not be 
well grounded, at least on this measure. 
Nowhere is the Federal Circuit's controversial role as the locus of judicial 
power in the U.S. patent system more evident than in the context of the doctrine 
of obviousness under 35 U.S. C. §I 03. The determination of whether an inven­
tion was "obvious" to "a person having ordinary skill in the art" at the time the 
invention was made is the foundation of patentability-and thus at the very core 
of the patent bargain. And the issue's status as a question of law, as well as the 
spare statutory language, means that the law of obviousness is entirely a 
creation of the courts. 
In the study reported here. ·we systematically examined the Federal 
Circuit's doctrine of obviousness. Using empirical data collected from a novel 
data set spanning more than fifteen years ofjurisprudential pronouncements, we 
suggest that the Federal Circuit has developed a doctrine in this area that is 
relatively stable and appears reasonably predictable. Indeed, contrary to much 
recent commentary, these results suggest that the Federal Circuit's doctrinal 
tool kit-especial(v the much-discussed (and oft-maligned) "teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation" test for combinations of references-has not had a 
significant observable effect on the results of obviousness cases at that court. 
Although this study falls short of painting a complete picture of the Federal 
Circuit's performance with respect to patentability, the view that emerges is of a 
modern jurisprudence of obviousness that is more stable. more consistent, and 
more flexible than has been heretofore understood. These results, then, should 
give pause to those who argue for a radical reshaping of the Federal Circuit's 
doctrine under 35 U.S. C.§ 103. 
2007] 
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Nearly twenty-five years into the intentional experiment in institutional 
design that created it, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is unquestionably the most influential p layer in the U.S . patent 
system. 1 And as the economic significance of patents to the national econ­
omy continues to increase,2 the central role p layed by the Federal C ircuit has 
become increasingly visible,3 pronounced,4 and controversial. 5 
Nowhere is the importance of the Federal Circuit more apparent-and 
more discussed-than with respect to the standards for patentabi l ity, the 
fundamental requirements for obtaining a patent grant. In this context, the 
court is cast in two critical roles: as the oversight authority for the adminis­
trative body that grants patents (the U .S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO)) and as the sole appellate authority for litigated disputes involving 
already-issued patents. In determining patentabil ity, perhaps more than in 
------ -----------------------------
l .  See, e.g ,  M ark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. 
L .  REV. 387 ,  387  (200 1 )  ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . .  has become the de facto 
supreme court of patents .") .  From the creation of the Federal C ircuit until April 2006, the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari in only sixteen patent cases. Arthur J. G aj arsa & L awrence P. 
Cogswell ,  I I I , Fore,vord: The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM . U. L. REv. 82 1 ,  822 
(2006) 
2 .  See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1 8- 1 9  (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & M ark B. Myers eds . ,  2004) [hereinafter 
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY) ( acknowledging the economic importance of patents ) .  
See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, T O  PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003 ) ,  available at http: //www.ftc.gov/os/2003 / 1 0/ 
innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter To PROMOTE INNOVATION] (addressing the appropriate balance 
between competition and patent policy to foster innovation ) ;  FRED W ARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT 
WARS ( 1 994 ) (noting the critical n ature of patents in economic development). 
3. See. e.g ,  NTP, Inc. v .  Research in Motion, Ltd . ,  4 1 8  F . 3d  1 282  (Fed.  Cir. 2005 ) 
(adj udicating a patent infringement lawsuit against the makers of the B lackBerry wireless emai l  
system) .  
4. See Christian A .  Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction 
Trends, 1 6  BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I 075, I 098 (200 I) (noting that the Federal C ircuit's reversal rate 
hovers around 50%).  
5 .  Teleflex, Inc. v .  KSR Int ' l  Co. ,  1 1 9 F .  App 'x  2 82 ( Fed. Cir. 2005) ( vacating the district 
court ' s  grant of summary j udgment on the ground of obviousness) ,  rev 'd, 1 27 S. Ct. 1 72 7  (2007) ;  
.1ee. e.g ,  MercExchange, L .L.C .  v .  eBay, Inc . ,  40 1 F .3d  1 323 (Fed. Cir. 200 5 )  (reversing the district 
court's denial of a permanent injunction against infringement) ,  vacated, 1 26 S. Ct.  1 837 (2006) ;  see 
also. e g.. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1 6, KSR Int'l Co .  v. Teleflex, Inc . ,  126 S.  
Ct .  2965 ( 2006) (No. 04- 1 350)  [hereinafter B rief for the United States] (stating that the Federal 
Circui t's obviousness j urisprudence "renders patent examination and l itigation more costly, grants 
patent applicants unj ustified rewards for disclosing non-irmovative subject matter, and forecloses 
competitors from using the public storehouse of knowledge that should be freely available to all" ) ;  
Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property Law Professors as  Amici Curiae in  Support of Petitioner 
at 2 .  KSR Int ' l  Co. v .  Teleflex, Inc . ,  1 26 S. Ct. 2965 (2006 ) (No. 04- 1 3 50 )  [hereinafter Professors' 
Brietl (characterizing the Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness j urisprudence as "at odds with the statutory 
l anguage. inconsistent with [the Supreme] Court ' s  precedent, and contrary to the goals of the patent 
system") .  For some information concerning practitioner complaints, see, for example, P au l  R. 
Michel, The Couu of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Aleet the Challenges Ahead, 
48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 1 77,  1 1 82-85 ( 1 999) (addressing the debate over the Federal C ircuit 's  
increasing role ) .  
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any other aspect of the patent system, the centralization of legal power that is  
the core justification for the Federal Circuit6 is  brought into sharp rel ief. 
In this study, we use a novel data set and well-tested techniques to 
empirically assess the Federal Circuit ' s  performance7 in the realm of 
patentability-specifically with respect to the court ' s  doctrine of  obviousness 
under 35 U.S.C .  § 1 03 .  That section ' s  requirement-that a patentable inven­
tion be nonobvious to a person having ordinary ski l l  in the art at the t ime the 
invention was made8-is plainly the "ultimate condition of patentabil ity,"9 
and thus lies at the core of the basic quid pro quo that is the foundation of 
patent theory . 
Assessing the law of obviousness is not only important to understanding 
the institutional role of the Federal C ircuit; it is  also of crit ical (and timely) 
importance in its own right. The scholarly and popular literature is  replete 
with the assertion that the standards for patentabil ity (especially obviousness) 
have been dramatically weakened by the Federal Circuit. 1 0 I mpm1ant recent 
studies of the patent system have also fingered obviousness as a particular 
area of policy makers ' concern." And perhaps most importantly,  in June 
2006, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR 
International Co. v. Telejlex, Inc. 1 2  to review the Federal Circuit ' s  approach 
to obviousness, most espec ially that court ' s  requirement of a teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) to combine prior art references. 1 3 A 
6. See, e.g., S .  REP. No. 97-275, at 4-5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U . S . C .C .A .N .  ll, 14-15 
(stating that the creation of a centralized court to hear suits related to patents wi l l  provi de doctrinal 
stabi l i ty and as a result will decrease uncertainty and increase i nnovat ion) .  For what is perhaps the 
seminal theoretical piece considering the f01mation of the Federal Circuit, see Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N .Y. U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
7. See infra Part III; see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L .  R EV. 1105 (2004) 
(using judicial opinions as a source of data in the same manner as this Artic le ) .  
8.  35 U .S .C.  § l 03(a) (2000). 
9. NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon 
ed. ,  1980). 
10. See, e.g. , Robert W. Harris, The Emerging Primac_v of "Secondwy Comiderations" as 
Validity Ammunition.· Has the Federal Circuit Gone Too Far:;, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
Soc'y 185, 201 (1989) ( discussing the start of a general trend in the Federal Circuit towards 
favoring the issuance of patents) ;  Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: 
Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L .  REV. 827, 833 ( 1999) ( po inting out the lowered 
bar for obviousness in the area of biotechnology) ;  Katherine J. Strandburg et a!., Law and the 
Science of Nenvorks: An Overview and an Application to the "Patent Explosion, 
. . 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1293, 1329-38 (2006) (asserting that the weakening of patentability standards is a major 
cause o f  the recent "patent explosion") .  
11. See T o  PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, a t  8-15 ( reporting the testimony a n d  writings 
of a number of commentators critical of the Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness law); A PATENT SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 87-94 ( i dentifying the court ' s  obviousness law as in need 
of change) .  
12. Teleflex, Inc. v .  KSR Int'1 Co. ,  119 F .  App'x 282 (Fed. C ir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S .  Ct. 1727 
(2007). 
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, KSR Int'l Co.  v. Teleflex. Inc. , 126 S Ct.  2965 (2006) 
(No.  04-1350). 
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common thread that runs through these contemporary criticisms is that the 
Federal Circuit ' s  approach to obviousness is systematically biased in favor of 
patentability and thus has dramatically weakened the statutory obviousness 
requirement. 
The results we report here suggest that much of the current commentary 
may overstate the concerns with the Federal Circui t ' s  approach to 
obviousness . Among other results, we find the fol lowing: 
1 .  The Federal Circuit finds patents obvious a clear majority o f  the 
time. Overall ,  about 58% of all analyses result in  a finding of 
obviousness ; this trend has been increasing since 1 990. This ratio 
does not seem to be associated with broad technological areas . 
2 .  The Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion, or  motivation analysis 
does not appear to dominate the law of obviousness. We find that 
the TSM analysis is used less than half of the time ( 45%) in obvi­
ousness analyses by the Federal Circuit. Whether the TSM 
analysis i s  used seems to have no observable effect on whether the 
reviewed analysis is affirmed and only a modest impact (about 5%) 
on whether the patent is dec lared obvious. Even within TSM­
based cases, a majority of Federal C ircuit analyses (52.4%) result 
in a determination of obviousness . 
3 .  The TSM analysis appears not to be an inflexible tool biased in 
favor of patentability. Although we find that the rate at which the 
TSM analysis is applied has increased substantially during the 
course of the study, the rate at which TSM analyses result in de­
terminations of obviousness has also increased significantly. 
Fw1her, we document a significant increase in the number of 
sources that the Federal Circuit uses to analyze a TSM.  
4. The Federal Circuit affirms determinations of obviousness a clear 
majority of the time.  More than 65% of the obviousness analyses 
reviewed by the Federal Circuit are affirmed, and the rate at which 
the Federal Circuit reverses or vacates obviousness decisions by 
the PTO has been fal ling steadily. 
5 .  The PTO seems to fare n o  worse than the courts when having its 
obviousness analyses reviewed by the Federal Circuit. The overall 
affirmance rate for the PTO is 64%�virtually the same as the 65% 
average for all cases with obviousness determinations. The affir­
mance rate for the PTO increased during the time period of the 
study. 
6. The Federal Circuit's doctrine in th is area seems relatively stable. 
During the term of the study, the reversal rate of lower tribunals ' 
obviousness analyses was relatively steady. The overall rate of 
obviousness analyses increased, though modestly. 
These findings, then, while not presenting a comprehensive picture of 
the Federal C ircuit ' s  perfon ance in implementing the standards for 
2056 Texas Law Review [Vol .  85:2051 
patentabi lity, do offer a significant advance in understanding over the 
existing literature-as wel l  as perhaps call ing some recent commentary and 
legal fi lings into question. On the whole, the j urisprudence of obviousness, 
as developed by the Federal C ircuit, appears relatively stable  and increas­
ingly flexible. At least some data suggest that the Federal C ircuit has 
identified the ISM doctrinal formulation as a way to consistently and coher­
ently frame the otherwise obtuse obviousness analysis .  Accordingly, this 
long-term systematic view may help p lace the current debate about the law of 
obviousness in a more appropriate context. F inally, beyond adding obj ective 
information concerning the trends and overal l  developments of the Federal 
C ircuit ' s  obviousness jurisprudence-and some insight into the success of 
the court in meeting its mandate-this study both establishes the need for 
future work in this area and provides suggestions for the future directions of 
investigation in this area. 
*** 
The balance of this Article proceeds as fol lows. Part I I  reviews the 
doctrinal and theoretical background of the Federal Circuit and the law of 
obviousness under 35 U.S.C .  § 1 03 ,  and outlines the current controversy sur­
rounding the court ' s  development of this area of the law. It also examines 
the Federal C ircuit' s treatment of the law of obviousness. Part I I I  sets forth 
the study ' s  design and methodologies .  Part IV  reports the results of the study 
and offers some interpretation and discussion. And Parts V and V I  consider 
the overall imp lications of the results, policy prescriptions, and future 
directions; while Part VII  addresses the current state of the j urisprudence of 
obviousness after the Supreme Court ' s opinion in the now famous case of  
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. , which was argued and decided during 
the production of this Article. 
I I .  The Federal C ircuit and the Law of Obviousness 
A.  The Federal Circuit: A n  Exercise in  Institutional Design 14 
Even from the distance of twenty-five years , there can be little dispute 
over what Congress thought it was doing when it created the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal C ircuit. By the enactment of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act (FCIA)  of 1 982 , 1 5 Congress unified in the Federal Circuit 
1 4 . We provide only a review because this subject has been addressed in more depth in  other 
places. For a more i n-depth discussion of the institutional design of the Federal C ircuit, see Charles  
W .  Adams, The Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court. 49 
Mo. L. REv. 43 ( 1 984 ), Dreyfuss, supra note 6,  and Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at I I  07-
24. 
1 5 . Federal Courts Improvement Act o f  1 982,  Pub. L.  No.  97- 1 64, 96 Stat .  25  (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of28 U . S .  C . ) .  
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the appellate jurisdiction for patent cases, 16 whether from the U.S.  Patent and 
Trademark Office, the U.S. district courts, the Court of Federal Claims, or 
the Court of International Trade ( ITC) .  It did so at a time when it was widely 
thought that the legal infrastructure of the patent system was in disarray. 
Legislators were confronted with information that the interpretation of the 
patent law differed in different par1s of the country.17 Studies predating 
FCIA revealed that a patent was more "l ikely to be held valid and infringed 
in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times more 
l ikely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit ."18 
With such a legal landscape, it comes as little surprise that forum shopping in 
patent law was rampant, 19 resulting in much collateral litigation.20 Moreover, 
because the decisions of the regional circuits were not binding on one 
another, there was little to be done but wait for the Supreme Court to rectify 
the situation. This did not happen, and the testimony presented to the legis­
lators suggested that it was very unlikely that the Supreme Court would be 
able to unify the disparate behaviors of the regional c ircuits .  2 1  
In  l ight of rare Supreme Com1 involvement, the Patent Office and its 
pre- 1 982  reviewing court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), 
operated outside the influence of the regional c ircuits in developing the law 
surrounding patentability. 22 But the law the CCPA developed concerning 
whether a patent should issue could not be imposed by the CCP A on the re­
gional circuits. 23 This left the infrastructure of patent law in an odd place: 
one court, the CCPA, developing and applying standards of patentabi lity to 
decide whether patents should issue, and other courts, the regional c ircuits, 
16. The authors are of course a ware of the Supreme Court's decision in  Holmes Group. Inc. v. 
Varnado Air Circulation Systems. Inc.. 535 U .S .  826 ( 2002 ) ,  which permits appeals of some patent 
issues to return to the regional circuits .  
17. Se e S. REP. No. 97-2 7 5, at 5 (1981),  as reprinted in 1 982 U. S .C .C .A.N. II, 15 ("[ P]atent 
law [is] an area in  which the appl ication of the law to the facts of a case often produces d ifferent 
outcomes in d ifferent courtrooms in substantially s imilar cases ."). 
18. See Dreyfuss. supra note 6.  at 7 ( citing Thomas Coach, The Stundard oj'fnvention in the 
Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEi'vl 34, 56-59 ( Wi l l iam B .  Bal l ed . ,  1 960 ) ) .  
19 . SeeS. REP. No. 97-27 5, a t  3-6. as reprinted in  1982 U .S .C .C .A.N. I I , 1 3- 1 6  (discussing 
reports that forum shopping was common to patent l itigat ion) .  
20.  See id. at 5 ,  as reprinted in 1982 U .S .C .C .A.N. II. 15 ( di scussing reports that forum 
shopping "increases the cost of l i tigation and 'demeans the entire judicial  process and the patent 
system as well"') . 
2 1. It is generally thought that the most l ikely reason for this was the s ize of the Supreme 
Court ' s  docket and, perhaps, a recalc itrance to take patent cases due to the ir  high level of legal and 
teclmical difficulty. See Adams. supra note 1 4 ,  at 45 ( noting a higher level of certiorari petitions at 
the t ime) ;  Dreyfuss, supra note 6.  at 6 ( " Perhaps because of its own docket problems and its lack of 
expertise, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed the patent law decisions of the regional circuits. "). 
This is a lso consistent with the Senate Report that notes that the Supreme Court "appears to be 
operating at-or close to-ful l  capacity; therefore. in the future the Court cannot be expected to 
provide much more guidance in legal issues than it now does ."  S. REP. NO. 97-275 ,  at 3, as 
reprinted in 1 982 U.S .C .C .A.N. II. 1 3. 
22 .  Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6 .  
23. /d. 
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applying disparate standards24 to determine whether a given patent should 
have issued. Naturally, this led to uncertainty. Patents i ssued by the Patent 
Office under laws developed in its relationship with the CCP A were later 
invalidated under a regional c ircuit ' s  alternative interpretation of the same 
laws.25 
In  the time leading up to the passage of FCIA, Congress was also 
confronted with testimony by representatives of technologically oriented 
businesses confirming that patent cases were being inconsistently 
adjudicated.26 Moreover, the representatives of businesses that relied on the 
patent system contended that the legal infrastructure of the patent law had 
important imp lications for the national economy. In particular, it was con­
tended that the uncertainty attending the then-current patent law 
infrastructure was harmful to innovation, and if  uncertainty in the patent 
system could be lessened, innovation would increase .27 
After hearing the testimony, Congress determined that national 
uniformity in patent law was desirable .  National uniformity would bring 
uniformity of doctrinal development,28 doctrinal stab il ity,29 and 
predictabi l ity30 to the law. The solution was FCIA, the unification of patent 
appeals3 1 under a single appellate j urisdiction.32 In sum, the vesting in the 
Federal Circuit of exclusive jurisdiction of patent appeals has been based on 
a consi stent and transparent l ine of reasoning. First, the Federal Circuit, 
p laying a unitary judicial role, wi l l  manage, develop, and pol ice the patent 
law. Second, the imposition of thi s  institutional design wi l l  promote a 
24. See Adams, supra note 1 4, at 55-57 (noting the heterogeneity of regional circuit standards) .  
25 .  This  observation is captured nicely by Professor Dreyfuss. See Dreyfuss, supra note 6,  at  6 
( indicating that the decisions of the CCPA did not receive the respect of regional courts and that the 
presumption of validity in regard to CCPA decisions was steadily eroded by these regional court s). 
26 .  S .  REP. No. 97-275,  at 5, as reprinted in 1 982 U .S .C .C.A.N. 1 1 , 1 5 .  
27. See id. at 6, as reprinted in 1982 U .S .C .C .A.N.  11, 1 6  (reporting the comments ofl:- larry F .  
Manbeck, Jr., General Patent Counsel of  General Electric Company, who testified that doctrinal 
stability has an effect on innovation and that decreasing uncertainties are important to business 
decision making). 
28. See id. at 5, as reprinted in 1 982 U . S .C.C.A.N.  11, 1 5 .  
2 9 .  See id. ("The Federal C ircuit a lso provides a forum that will  increase doctrinal stabi l ity in  
the field of  patent law.") .  
30 .  See id. at 6, as reprinted in 1 982 U . S .C.C.A.N.  11, 1 6  ( stating that stable and predictable 
law is better for the national economy) .  
3 1 .  It is worth noting that the record is  clear that Congress does not intend that the Federal 
C ircuit be a "specialized" court as that term is so often, and pejoratively, used.  Rather, Congress 
was express in the alternative stating: 
Id 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal C ircuit wi l l  not be a "special i zed court," as 
that term is  normally used. The court's JUrisdiction will not be limited to one type of 
case, or  even two or three types  of cases . . .  it wi l l  have a varied docket spanning a 
broad range of legal issues and types of cases. 
32. See id. at 4, as reprinted in 1982 U .S .C .C .A .N. 1 1 ,  1 4  ("The Court o f  Appeals for the 
Federal C ircuit provides such a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law 
where Congress determines that there i s  a special need for national uniformity.") .  
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clearer, more stable, and predictable patent doctrine, which in tum will  re­
duce forum shopping and improve the economic usefulness of important 
property rights. 33 
Few would doubt that Congress ' s  structural goals have been met. The 
Federal C ircuit has moved with alacrity into its role as manager, developer, 
and enforcer of the patent doctrine. In an inexorable fashion, it has expanded 
its influence over the jurisprudence in a number of doctrinal areas, including 
claim interpretation,34 the standard for obviousness,35 remedies,36 procedural 
issues,37 anticipation,38 and inequitable conduct.39 But while  the institutional 
design imagined by Congress has been realized, the question remains 
whether the court has been successful in achieving the promise that original ly 
motivated congressional action. 
B. The Problem of Nonobviousness 
Under the U. S. patent laws, patents are available for al l40 inventions that 
are new, useful, and nonobvious. The requirement that an invention be use­
ful i s ,  generally speaking, rather easy to meet. The requirement that an 
invention be new-that it has not previously been possessed by the pub lic­
is, if not also easy to meet, at least relatively easy to determine. The re­
quirement that an invention be nonobvious, however, seeks to determine 
whether, at the time it was made, a person having ordinary skil l  in the art 
would view the invention as a sufficient technical advance over existing 
technology to warrant the grant of a patent. Underlying thi s  determination is  
a concept that has been described by one famous jurist as  being "as fugitive, 
impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole parapher­
nalia of legal concepts."4 1 Patent l awyers have called the nonobviousness 
requirement the "ultimate condition of patentabi l ity. "42 Below we review the 
doctrinal characteristics of nonobviousness and then describe the contours of 
the current controversies surrounding it . 
33.  !d. at 5-6, as reprinted in 1 982 U . S .C .C .A.N .  II, 15-16 ; Dreyfuss, supra note 6 ,  at 7 .  
34 .  See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7 (discussing the Federal Circuit's development of 
c laim-interpretation jurisprudence). 
3 5 .  See infi·a subpart Il(B). 
36 .  Dreyfuss ,  supra note 6. at 18- 1 9. 
37 .  See id at 30--52 ( di scussing some areas where the court has wielded j urisprudential 
influence and concluding that the court ' s  success was mixed) .  
38.  !d. at 1 0-- 1 1 . 
39 .  !d. at 2 1 -22. 
40. This is a necessarily sweeping statement. I t  should be noted that there are of course other 
things a patent applicant needs to do before a patent may be obtained. For example,  a patent 
applicant must file a timely application that includes information suffic ient to disclose and enable 
the invention. See 3 5  U S. C .  §§ 102 ,  1 1 2  (2000). 
4 1 .  Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 1 83 F .2d 1 58 ,  1 62 (2d Cir. 1 950)  (Hand, C . J . ). 
42.  NONOBVlOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 9 .  
2060 Texas Law Review [Vol .  85: 2051 
I. A Primer on Obviousness. 43-As noted above, the law of 
obviousness i s  directed to ascertaining whether the subject matter c laimed to 
be patentable is a sufficient advance over existing technology to warrant the 
grant of a patent. A lthough it had existed as judge-made law for many years, 
a formal requirement of nonobviousness first entered the statutory patent law 
with the Patent Act of 1 952.44 The current formal statement of the require­
ment of nonobviousness is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 1 03 (a). It states:  
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made.45 
The relevant statutory inquiry then is whether "the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subj ect matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary ski l l  in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains."46 In the years fol lowing the passage of the Patent Act of 
1 952. the question turned to how best to determine the answer to that inquiry. 
The Supreme Court addressed that question in  one of its last and most 
meaningful  cases on the issue, the seminal decision of Graham v. John 
Deere.47 There the Court set out the well-worn considerations relevant for 
determining obviousness. It stated: 
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the 
§ 103 condition ... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue 
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobvious­
ness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary 
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, 
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to 
be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these 
inquiries may have relevancy.48 
43. Those readers familiar with the obviousness requirement of modem patent law may wish to 
skip this section. 
44. Patent Act of 1 952. ch. 950, § 1 03 ,  66 Stat. 792, 798 ( 1 95 2 )  ( codified as amended at 3 5  
U.S . C  § 103(a) (2000 ) ) .  
45 .  3 5  U .S .C § 1 03 (a ) .  
46. Id 
47. Graham v. John Deere Co.  of Kan. Ci ty. 383  U .S .  1 ( 1 966 ) .  
48 .  !d. a t  1 7 - 1 8  ( c itation omitted) .  
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The Court proceeded to acknowledge the difficulties in determining 
whether subject matter i s  obvious and stated that it expected appellate court 
involvement in the development of the doctrine.49 The Court then stressed its 
view that the factual inquiry set forth in its opinion was of significant impor­
tance to establ ishing congressionally desired uniformity and definiteness in 
the jurispmdence of obviousness .  50 
The Graham factor-based analysis was not the only guidance the Court 
provided in setting out its functional approach to determining obviousness .  
The Court also examined the meaning of the language "at the t ime the inven­
tion was made,' '5 1  citing prior case law52 as wel l  as legislative reports 
explaining the intended meaning of the language: 
It refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as 
described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person 
skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.53 
These sources, according to the Court "place[ d] emphasis on the pertinent art 
exi sting at the time the invention was made."54 
This language plainly cautions against looking backwards to determine 
obviousness, which the Court noted later when considering whether (in a 
consolidated case) the claims of  a contested patent should be considered 
obvious . There the Court spoke in favorable terms regarding objective 
evidence on nonobviousness because not only was it the sort of evidence that 
was "more susceptible of j udicial treatment than are the highly technical 
facts . . . .  [Such inquiries] may also serve to guard against s l ipping into use 
of h indsight . . .  and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the 
teachings of the invention in issue. "55  
Over the years the Federal Circuit has paid great homage to the decision 
in Graham.56 Not only has it consistently relied on the Supreme Court 's  
factor-based approach to determining the question of obviousness, it has also 
49. See id. at 1 8  (noting that case-by-case development lends itself well  to the fact-intensive 
inquiry that patent cases require ) .  
50 .  Jd 
5 1 .  35 U.S .C .  § l 03(a) (2000) .  
5 2 .  Graham. 3 8 3  U.S .  a t  14. 
53. !d. at 1 5  ( citing S .  REP. No. 82- 1 979, at 6 ( 1 952 )  and H .  REP. No. 82-1 923,  at 7 ( 1952 ) ) ;  see 
also 35 U .S .  C. § I 02 ( describing what constitutes prior art) .  
54. Graham, 383  U. S .  at 1 4 . 
55 .  !d. at 3 6  ( internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
56. A search of Federal C ircuit opinions on L EXIS ,  for the period of the study using the search 
terms "patent 1100 obvious" and "Graham" revealed 1 72 cases. A similar search using the terms 
"patent 1100 obvious" and "'383 U .S .  I"' ( the U .S .  Reports citation for Graham v. John Deere) 
revealed 1 56 cases. The difference is most likely due to the court's common usage of the term 
"Graham fac tors" to describe the analysis set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion. See, e.g ,  
Group One, Ltd. v .  Hallmark Cards, Inc . ,  407 F.3d 1 297,  1304 (Fed. C ir .  2005 ) ( referring to 
"Graham factors" without citing to the U . S . Reports) .  
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accepted the Supreme Court ' s  invitation for appellate comi involvement. In 
that vein, i t  has focused its attention on developing the jurisprudence sur­
rounding the Supreme Court ' s  holding that the determination of obviousness 
is  to be ascertained at the time the invention was made. 5 7  To ensure that the 
obviousness inquiry is properly temporal ly located, the court has used per­
haps the most straightforward approach. I t  has, as a conceptual matter, 
relocated the obviousness inquiry to the "time the invention was made."58 I t  
then asks, in l ight of the contemporaneous topography of relevant prior art, 
whether the claimed subject matter would be apparent to or easily perceived 
by a person of ordinary skil l  in the relevant art. 59 
This rather simple logical step has given rise to the kernel  of the court ' s  
contribution to the obviousness analysis set forth in Graham : that somewhere 
within the ful l  scope of the relevant prior aii, the c laimed subj ect matter must 
be sufficiently taught or suggested that i t  would have been easily perceived 
by a person of ordinary skill in the art. As a consequence of some of the l in­
guistic formulations that appear in the Federal Circuit case law, the 
requirement that prior art make apparent the arrangement of disparate 
sources and teachings has come to be known as the "suggestion test" or the 
requirement that the prior art provide a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
collect and combine disparate sources of prior art information. For purposes 
of uniformity, for the remainder of the Article we will  refer to the test as 
either "the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test" or "TSM." 
An example of the l inguistic formulation of the teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation test, as wel l  as an explanation of its underlying logic, is  excerpted 
from a prominent Federal C ircuit opinion.60 After explaining the contro l l ing 
nature of the Graham factors, the court states: 
Measuring a claimed invention against the standard established by 
section 103 requires the oft-difficult but critical step of casting the 
mind back to the time of invention, to consider the thinking of one of 
ordinary skill in the art, guided only by the prior art references and the 
then-accepted wisdom in the field . . .. 
Our case law makes clear that the best defense against the subtle 
but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is 
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching 
5 7. See Iron Grip Barbell  Co. v. U S A  Sports, Inc . ,  392 F . 3d  1 3 1 7, 1 320 ( fed C i r. 2004 ) ( "We 
tum first to a comparison between the prior art and the c laimed i nvention. In this inquiry, we are 
mindfu l  of the repeated warnings of the Supreme Court and this court as to the danger of hindsight 
bias ." (c iting Graham, 383  U .S. at 36 ) ) .  
58 .  See, e.g, In re  P iasecki, 745 F .2d  1 468, 1 474 (Fed. C ir. 1 984 ) ( taking into account evidence 
of nonobviousness of an invention "at the time the invention was made") .  
59 .  See id. at 1475 ( finding the contested patent was not obvious at the time the invention was 
made). 
60. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F .3d  994 ( Fed. C ir. 1999 ) ( considering a Patent Office rejection 
for obviousness of a patent appl ication for an orange yard bag with a j ack-o' - lantern depicted on i ts 
exterior). 
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or motivation to combine prior art references. See, e.g. , CR. Bard, 
Inc. v. MJ Sys. ,  Inc. , 1 57  F.3d 1340, 1352,  48 USPQ2d 1225 ,  1232 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing "teaching or suggestion or motivation [to 
combine]" as an "essential evidentiary component of an obviousness 
holding") . . .  Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc. , 
776 F .2d 28 1 ,  297,  227 USPQ 657,  667 (Fed. Cir. 1985 )  (district 
court 's  conclusion of obviousness was error when it "did not elucidate 
any factual teachings, suggestions or incentives from this prior art that 
showed the propriety of combination"). See also Graham, 383 U .S .  at 
1 8 ,  86 S .  Ct. 684, 1 5  L .Ed.2d 545, 148 USPQ at 467 ("strict 
observance" of factual predicates to obviousness conclusion required). 
Combining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion, 
teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor' s  disclosure as a 
blueprint for piec ing together the prior art to defeat patentability-the 
essence of hindsight. 6 1  
The excerpted section shows the court ' s  concern with the problem of 
hindsight and reveals that the reason for the concern exists at least in part 
because of notions that there is a high risk of unfairness in using an 
inventor' s potential contribution to the storehouse of public knowledge as a 
road map to characterizing that same contribution as obvious .62 It also re­
veals that the court ' s  rationale for the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test 
is an '"essential evidentiary component of an obviousness holding. "'63 
Another prescribed aspect of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test 
is that it must consider the full scope of the relevant prior art. Thus, as evi­
denced by the linguistic formulation in In re Dembiczak, the "evidence of a 
suggestion, teaching or motivation to combine may flow from the prior art 
references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skil l  in  the art, or, in 
some cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved."64 By casting a 
wide net, the Federal C ircuit ' s  test seeks to provide the public max1mum 
protection against the spurious issue of patents . 
However, the jurisprudence suggests that the court has sought to 
balance the publ ic ' s  interest in preventing the spurious issue of patents with 
the public ' s  competing interests in rewarding innovation and in receiving 
disclosure of nonobvious inventions. Thus, the court has cautioned that 
while the net of prior art ev idence is very broad, there must stil l  be evidence :  
"The range of sources avai lable . . .  does not diminish the requirement for 
6 1 .  ld at 999. 
62 .  I t  is worth noting that the use of hindsight i s  not strictly prohibited in an obviousness 
analyses. See Ruiz v. A.B .  Chance Co. ,  3 5 7  F .3d  1 270 ,  1276 ( Fed. C ir. 2004) ( "Whi le  this court 
indeed wams against employing hindsight, its counsel is j ust that-a warning. That warning does 
not provide a rul e  of law that an express, written moti vation to combine must appear in prior art 
references before a tinding of obviousness . "  (emphasis added ) ) .  
63 .  Dembic::uk, 1 75 F . 3 d  a t  9 9 9  ( quoting C .R. Bard, Inc . v.  M3 Sys. , Inc . ,  1 57  F . 3d  1340, 1352 
( Fed. Cir. 1 99 8 ) )  
64. ! d.  ( emphasis added ) .  
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actual evidence . . . . Broad conclusory statements regarding the teaching of 
multiple references, standing alone, are not ' evidence. "'65 
At least facially, then, the Federal C ircuit ' s  teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation test appears to foster three important values that Congress and the 
Supreme Court hoped would evolve in the jurisprudence of patents .  By c lari ­
fying the requirement that somewhere in the prior art there must exist a 
teaching that would make the c laimed subject matter apparent to a person of 
ordinary ski l l  in the art, the court has at once improved the obj ectivity of the 
obviousness determination, making it more amenable to judicial treatment 
and review (obj ectivity and uniformity). The court has also made the test 
more precise in terms of giving patent challengers and the Patent Office clear 
guidance (a road map) on how to establ ish obviousness, while at the same 
time serving the publi c ' s  interest in promoting the l ikelihood that deserving 
patentees will obtain patents and continue making valuable disclosures 
(promoting innovation). In l arge measure, al l of this has been achieved by 
l ittle more than requiring a richer examination of the scope and content of the 
prior art. 
If this seems a l ittle too good to be true, it may be. As discussed below, 
there is considerable debate on whether the Federal Circuit ' s  development of 
the obviousness jurisprudence has had an overall positive effect on the patent 
system. 
2. The Controversy of TSM.-While litigants have long challenged the 
requirement that the prior art include within its scope information that shows 
how and why a claimed combination would be obvious to a person of 
ordinary ski l l  in the art,66 i t  has been only fairly recently that the issue has 
received the current high level of national attention. The l ightning rod is the 
Federal Circuit ' s  treatment of the obviousness inquiry in Telejlex, Inc. v. KSR 
International Co. ,67 a nonprecedential opinion in which the court vacated and 
remanded for further fact-finding a district court ' s  summary j udgment that 
the relevant c laims of the patent at issue were invalid as obvious.68 
The case itself follows on the heels of two well-known reports, both of 
which were critical of the Federal Circui t ' s  obviousness jurispmdence, and 
both of which concluded that the way the court had developed the doctrine 
65.  !d ;  see also. e.g ,  In re Rouffe t, 1 49 F.3d 1 3 50, 1 357-58 ( Fed. Cir. 1 99 8 )  ( requi ring that the 
Patent Office provide evidence for its assertion that a person of ordinary ski l l  in the ar1 would 
col lec t and combine disparate sources of prior art); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1 2 60, 1 265 ( Fed. C ir. 
1 992 ) (holding that the Patent Office must provide a "showing [ ot1 some objective teaching in the 
prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that 
individual to combine the relevant teachings" (quoting In re Fine, 83 7 F .2d I 0 7 1 ,  I 074 ( Fed. C ir. 
1 98 8 ) ) ) .  
6 6 .  See Gillette C o .  v.  S . C .  Johnson & Son, Inc . ,  9 1 9  F .2d 720, 7 2 3  ( Fed. C ir. 1 990) 
("(Appellant] urges that the district court . . .  commi tted legal en-or by requiring that a claimed 
combination be ' clearly suggested' by the prior art in  order to be obvious ." ) .  
67 .  1 1 9 F.  App 'x  282 ( Fed. Cir. 2005 ) ,  rev 'd, 1 27 S .  Ct. 1 72 7  (2007) .  
68 .  ld 
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made it too easy to obtain a patent.69 At around the same time, the issue was 
raised in the popular press by, inter alia, the book Innovation and Its 
Discontents, which asserted that patents regularly issue despite "clear 
evidence of invalidity ."70 Moreover, contemporaneous with these events, a 
burgeoning body of scholarly l iterature was vociferously comp laining about 
the Federal Circuit ' s  development of both the patent jurisprudence generally 
and the jurisprudence of obviousness particularly. 7 1  
KSR International itself involves a patent directed to adj ustable pedal 
assemblies. 72 An adjustable pedal assembly is a device that permits a pedal 
(such as a gas pedal) to be adjusted in position according to the user' s 
preference . 73 In  the claims at issue, the adjustable pedal assemblies contain 
an electronic sensor that performs the function of detecting the pivot of the 
pedal and generating an electronic signal that conesponds to the pivot.74 The 
district court granted summary judgment, finding that the c laims were invalid 
as obvious, and the patentee appealed.75 Finding that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed on the issue of whether a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art to 
create the c laimed subject matter, the Federal C ircuit vacated and remanded 
for further fact-finding.76 The form of analysis is fami liar to those whc have 
read a number of Federal C ircuit obviousness opinions . Starting with the 
famil iar teachings of Graham, it then explains the requirement that the prior 
art, rather than the inventor' s teachings, must provide the analytical frame­
work for determining obviousness.  77 For purposes of comparison to In re 
69. See To P ROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2 ,  at 28 ( recommending that the legal standard 
developed by the Federal Circuit to prove invalidity is too high and needs to be lowered) ;  A PATENT 
S YSTEM FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 5-6 (recommending to improve the patent system 
by reinvigorating the nonobviousness standard) .  
70. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS D ISCONTENTS 34 (2004) 
( ' " [T)he granting of patents despite c lear evidence of invalidity, in the form of prior art that makes 
the invention not novel and/or obvious, has become all too common." ) .  
7 1. See. e.g ,  Jolm H .  Barton, Non-Obviousness, 4 3  I DEA 4 7 5 ,  4 7 7  (200 3 )  ("The non­
obviousness standard has since been . . .  greatly weakened in a very specific and relatively detailed 
body of patent law, developed primarily by the [Federal C ircuit] . . . .  " ) ;  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom ? Evaluaring lnvenrions jimn the Perspective ol PHOSITA , 1 9  B ERKELEY TECH. 
LJ. 885. 889 ( 2004) ("Courts have marginalized the role of PH OS IT A [or a person having ordinary 
skil l  in the art to which said subject matter pertains] by presuming that PHOSlT A is incapable of 
innovation and by treating detem1inations of nonobviousness as conclusions o f  law. They have 
further marginal ized P H  OS ITA ' s  role . . by requiring evidence of 'suggestion' to combine . . . .  " ) ;  
Glynn S .  Lunney, Jr., £-Obviousness, 7 MICH .  TELECOM1vl.  & TECH. L REV .  363 ,  3 7 3-74 (200 1 )  
( reportmg that s ince the advent of the Federal Circuit the use of the doctrine of obviousness has 
decreased as a means of  establishing invalidity in comparison to other doctrines and concluding that 
this means that obviousness is disfavored ) .  
72 .  Te!ejlex, 119  F .  App ' x  a t  283 .  
73 .  ld at  284  n . l .  
74. !d at 284. 
7 5 .  See. e. g ,  id at 2 8 3 .  
7 6 .  !d a t  290. 
77. See. e.g. , id at 2 8 5 .  
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Dembiczak, the KSR International court set forth the fol lowing analytic 
framework: 
A patent claim is obvious, and thus invalid, when the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art "are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." 
[citing, inter alia, Graham] .  While obviousness is ultimately a legal 
determination, it is based on several underlying issues of fact, namely: 
( 1 )  the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of skill of a 
person of ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the 
claimed invention and the teachings of the prior art; and ( 4) the extent 
of any objective indicia of non-obviousness. See Graham, 383 U .S .  at 
1 7- 1 8. When obviousness is based on the teachings of multiple prior 
art references, the movant must also establish some "suggestion, 
teaching, or motivation" that would have led a person of ordinary skill 
in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner 
claimed.
78 
Consistent with the jurisprudence, the court explained that the teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation could be found either explicitly or implicitly, in the 
prior art references themselves, in the knowledge of those of skill  in the art, 
or in the nature of the problems to be solved.79 It then examined the trial 
court ' s  opinion and determined that it had ( 1 )  improperly resolved disputed 
issues of fact, (2) failed to make findings on what "understanding or principle 
within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with 
no knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the manner 
c laimed,"80 (3)  erred in concluding that a prior art reference should be in­
cluded in the obviousness analysis when it did not address the problem 
solved by the patent at i ssue, ( 4) misunderstood the teachings of two other 
prior art references, and (5) mistakenly relied on the prosecution history in 
support of its argument for invalidity. 8 1  
The petition for certiorari attracted a surprising amount o f  attention, 
given that KSR International involved a relatively straightforward 
application of the settled law of the Federal C ircuit. Perhaps the two most 
noteworthy amicus briefs in favor of certiorari were the Brief of Twenty-four 
Intellectual Prope1iy Law Professors82 (Professors ' Brief) and the Brief for 
the United States .83 The briefs are particularly notable for both the high 
quality of their authors and the rather sweeping breadth of their arguments 
about the Federal C ircuit ' s  doctrine. 
78. ld at 285. 
79.  [d 
80 .  !d. at 288 ( quoting in re Kotzab, 2 1 7  F.3d  1 365 ,  1 3 7 1 ( Fed. Cir. 2000 ) ) .  
8 1 .  ld 
82 .  Professors' Brief, supra note 5 .  
83 .  Brief for the United States, supra note 5 .  
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These briefs make a number of c laims concerning the law, facts, and 
policy surrounding the Federal Circuit ' s  teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
test. Both briefs appear to be based on the empirical assumption that either 
too many patents have been issued, the rate at which low-quality patents is­
sue is accelerating to the point that the patent system i s  causing greater social 
harm than the disclosed innovations provide social benefit, or both.84 This 
assumption has not been empirically demonstrated,85 but it does flow fairly 
easily from property theory .86 Regardless, this assumption has enjoyed a 
measure of popular success and must be regarded as conventional wisdom at 
present. 87 (To be clear, we do not deny that patent quality i s  a serious policy 
concern; we simply note that the extent of the problem, and its impact, is not 
well understood. ) 
The briefs in favor of certiorari next make a causal claim: that the 
Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness jurisprudence can be l inked to greater numbers 
of low-quality patents . 88 While this has surface appeal-surely a too-low 
standard of patentability would impact patent quality to at least some 
degree-neither the briefs nor the sources supporting this view explain the 
causal l ink in any level of detai l .  (For example,  there are clearly a great 
many other plausible reasons for patent-quality problems, such as 
84. See id. at 1 6  ( stating that the Federal C ircui t ' s application of the T S M  analysis "grants 
patent appl icants unjustified rewards for disclosing non-innovative subject matter, and it forecloses 
competitors from using the publ ic storehouse of knowledge"); Professors' Brief, supra note 5, at 1 0  
( stating that the TSM analysis causes the issue o f  patent rights that have "pernicious social effects") .  
8 5 .  See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR T H E  2 1 ST CENTURY, supra note 2, a t  48 ("[T)he claim that 
quality has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way has not been empirical ly tested." ) .  Further, 
even those studies demonstrating a rise in patenting, or a rise in patenting intensity, fai l  to l ink such 
a rise with a loss of social benefits. See, e.g. , id. at 29, 46-63 .  Indeed, empirical demonstration, 
while l ikely possible, would be very costly. 
86. See. e.g. , Michael A. Hel ler & Rebecca S E isenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation ? The 
A nt/commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 ( 1 998 )  (explaining how multiple 
rights to exclude might cause an underuse of resources) .  It  i s  worth noting that there is also 
property theory that argues against this assumption, as well as some particularized examples of 
empirical work that show that i t  may not be a serious problem. See John P .  Walsh, Ashish Arora & 
Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in 
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 ,  33 1 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill 
eds., 2003 ) ( finding, inter alia, that upstream rights have not thus far significantly inhibited product 
development) ;  John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench. Patents 
und lvfaterial Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2003 ( 2005 ) (conc luding that the results of a survey of 
academic biomedical researchers offered " l i tt le empirical basis for c laims that restricted access to IP  
i s  currently impeding biomedical research") .  
87 .  See T o  PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2 ,  a t  5 ("Hearings participants raised concerns 
about the number of questionable patents issued. Such patents can block competition . . .  and harm 
innovation in serious ways." (c itation omitted) ) ;  A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1 ST CENTURY, supra 
note 2. at 3 ("Over the past decade the quality of issued patents has come under frequent sharp 
attack . . . .  " ) . 
88 .  E.g. , Professors' Brief, supra note 5 ,  at 1 3-14. 
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underfunding at the PTO, perverse incentives among prospective patentees 
and examiners alike, etc. 89) 
The next link in the logical chain among the KSR International 
advocates is that one particular aspect of the Federal Circuit ' s  obviousness 
j urisprudence is directly responsible for the low-quality-patent problem: the 
court ' s  TSM test. In particular, the government asserts that this test is an 
"inflexible rule" that presents "substantial obstacles in estab lishing 
obviousness . . . in a way that unnecessarily sustains patents that would 
otherwise be subject to invalidation as obvious."90 According to the 
professors, it thus prevents the Patent Office from "weed[ing]  out obvious 
patents"9 1  and causes patents to issue where the combination of preexisting 
technologies would have been obvious to a person of ordinary ski l l  in the 
art. 92 I t  does this, according to the briefs, by requiring a "showing [that] may 
be difficult or impossible" to make.93 This showing emphasizes written prior 
art references and "all but requires both the Patent and Trademark Office and 
the courts to base their analyses on documentary evidence of obviousness 
which wil l  often be unavailab le."94 The standard ascribed to the Federal 
C ircuit, the Professors ' Brief argues, "strays far" from the statutory standard 
because it looks "almost entirely to the contents of the prior art references to 
demonstrate obviousness. "95 
Thus, the construct against the Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness 
j urisprudence (especially the TSM test) takes the fol lowing form: 
1 .  Patent qual ity (the lack thereof) is a serious and growing problem 
that is degrading the innovative output of society; 
2. the Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness jurisprudence is a major 
component of this problem because it lowers the standard for 
patentabi l ity, making poor-quality patents easier to obtain; and 
89. While there is not a consensus regarding what consti tutes a low-qual i ty patent, as a general 
matter a low-qual i ty or questionable patent can be thought of as one that is l ikely to be mvalid .  See 
To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 5 ("A poor quali ty or questionable patent is one that i s  
l ikely invalid or  contains c laims that are l ikely overly broad.") .  The number and importance of 
potential causes of low-quali ty patents i s  also debated. Others view the substantive requirement as  
only a factor. See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY, supra note 2 ,  at  4 7  ( c i ting a lowered 
standard for nonobviousness, fewer prior art search resources at the Patent O ffice, lower examiner 
qualifications and experience, and increased workload as other factors ) ;  cf Lee Petherbridge, 
Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 1 74, 1 78 ( 2006 ) (arguing that another cause of quest ionable patents 
is poor information concerning the scope of the right sought during examination, and that g iven the 
difficulty and ambiguity associated wi th applying the substantive requirement, a more sensible 
approach to patent quality would include an enhanced focus on defining the meaning of the c laims 
during examination) .  
9 0 .  Brief for the United States, supra note 5 ,  a t  12 .  
91 .  Professors ' Brief, supra note 5 ,  at 9 .  
92.  !d. 
93 .  Brief for the United States, supra note 5 ,  at 14. 
94. Professors' Brief, supra note 5 ,  at 9. 
95. !d. at 5-6. 
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3 .  the Federal Circuit ' s  T S M  test i s  the primary culprit with respect to 
the court 's  obviousness jurisprudence because it renders the basic 
obviousness inquiry moot in many cases . 
Therefore,  a shift away from the TSM test will improve patent quality, and 
thus provide general societal benefits-by l imiting patentability to truly in­
novative inventions. 
Note that this construct is not only the basic logical chain of the litigants 
in KSR International; it is also the foundation of the broader controversy sur­
rounding the Federal Circuit ' s  modem j urisprudence of obviousness. 
As we noted above, the components of the argument vary in their 
empirical bases. Argument 1 is perhaps empirically testable .  But as the 
National Research Council reports, this has not been done.96 Argument 2-
that the Federal Circuit ' s  law of obviousness is to blame for a large number 
of low-quality patents-is difficul t  to test directly. The Federal Circuit has 
been the only court in the obviousness game for twenty-five years ; thus, there 
are no similarly situated appellate bodies with which to compare the Federal 
Circuit ' s  work in a patent system that is generally accepted as being vastly 
different than the one that existed at the time of Graham. Even so, the results 
of this study may provide at least some indirect evidence regarding how the 
j urisprudence of the Federal C ircuit relates to the patentability of inventions; 
as we note below, little in these results would support this view. Similarly, 
while Argument 3 is not definitively answered by this study, we again find 
l ittle evidence in our systematic analysis that would identify the TSM test as 
a driver of lower quality patents. Thus, we expect that this study will  be of 
substantial interest-not only in the cunent KSR International controversy, 
but with regard to the larger concern of the Federal Circuit ' s  law of 
obviousness. 
I I I .  Study Design and Methodology 
In view of the importance of the law of obviousness to the question of 
patentability and rhetoric accompanying cunent claims about the doctrine, 
we set out to gain information about the court ' s  performance in this area. To 
do so, we applied an approach with which we already had some experience:  
the systematic use of judicial opinions as a source of data of  the content of 
the Federal Circuit ' s  jurisprudence.97 Since our last effort, Professors Hall 
and Wright have surveyed the history and application of this approach to 
96. See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST C ENTURY, supra note 2 ,  at 3 ("The claim that quality 
has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way could be, but has not been, empirically tested." ) .  
97 .  See. e.g. , Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, a t  1 1 26 ( "[T]his study evaluates the Federal 
C ircuit ' s  methodological approach to claim construction by measuring-that is, categorizing 
according to standardized criteria-the court ' s  expressions of its methodology in the opinions 
accompanying judicial decisions.") .  
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legal scholarship in an article that provides both information and insight into 
the process and validity of using judicial opinions as a source of data. 98 
A .  A Primer o n  Content A nalysis 
Content analysis refers to the systematic reading and analysis of texts.99  
While the approach can be applied to most texts, perhaps one of its more 
interesting applications in the field of law comes from its application to 
judicial opinions. Content analysis differs from more traditional forms of 
legal scholarship in that it seeks an obj ective understanding of a body of law,  
rather than an interpretation of judicial opinions that are viewed as  symbolic 
or important. According to Hall and Wright, "[s]ystematic content analysis 
allows scholars to verify,  analyze, or refute the empirical claims about case­
law that are implic it or explicit in all branches of legal scholarship." 1 00 
While there may be a variety of ways to approach content analysis, it 
l ikely inc ludes four general components .  These include selecting cases, 
coding cases, counting case contents, and analyzing case coding. 1 0 1  Selecting 
cases refers to systematically identifying and collecting those cases l ikely to 
provide information concerning the subj ect of the study. Coding cases refers 
to the systematic application of a coding scheme designed to record features 
of each selected case. Once cases are coded, the features observed can be 
counted and relationships or  patterns described and analyzed, using in some 
cases descriptive statistics,  inferential statistics ,  or both . The counts col­
lected from the cases may be analyzed in any way that is reasonable in view 
of the study as a whole. Among others, these might include examining con­
nections between case outcomes and external influences,  examining 
relationships among the factors present in a case that might show order or be 
predictive of a particular outcome, or as reported in this Article ,  testing em­
pirical claims concerning the nature and effect of doctrine. 1 02 
There are important caveats to choosing j udicial opinions as a data set, 
the most important of which affect not only content analysis ,  but also more 
traditional interpretive forms of legal scholarship. These incl ude unobserved 
reasoning, selection bias, and strategic behavior. 1 0 3  Analyzing the content of 
judicial opinions relies on the assumption that facts and reasoning that appear 
in an opinion accurately reflect those from the underlying case. However, 
this is  a situation that may not always be true given that opinion authors are 
98. See Mark A.  Hall & Ronald F .  Wright, Systematic Content Analysis C!( Judicial Opinions 
( Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No .  9 1 3336, 2006) , 
a vailable at http://ssm.com/abstract=9 1 3336 .  
99 .  !d. a t  3 .  
1 00 .  !d. a t  1 0 . 
1 0 1 .  ld at 1 1 . 
1 02 .  See id. at 1 0  ("Systematic content analysis allows scholars to verify, analyze, or refute the 
empirical claims about case law that are implicit or expl ic i t  in  al l  branches of !egal scholarship.") .  
I 03 . See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7,  at 1 1 28-30 (considering these oft-cited 
concerns and l imitations about using judicial opinions for systematic study) .  
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generally concerned with justifying their conclusion "by showing that it pro­
ceeds from accepted sources by legitimate, properly argued steps." 1 04 
Judicial opinions are also subject to selection bias at several levels. Some 
types of disputes may be less l ikely to reach trial; others that reach trial may 
be less l ikely to generate opinions . Of those that are tried, some will not be 
appealed, and some when appealed may not generate an opinion. 1 05 Others 
may generate only an unpublished opinion, which may affect the scope or 
depth of analysis that the court will provide. And even when opinions are 
published, they are subject  to strategic behavior. The l itigation choices of the 
parties can impact the facts that make it into a ·case; l itigants ,  having different 
expectations for the outcome, may contend that the same governing doctrinal 
principle controls a case, making it more likely that the court will address 
that principle in any opinion it  might author. 
There is l ittle question that these potential limitations exist to some 
degree in the study underlying this Article. But there are some reasons to 
think that they may be less s ignificant here . In particular, as described 
below, this study evaluates the content of the jurisprudence itself. In that 
sense, it concerns itself with the facts and statements of principle and rea­
soning that have made it into opinions. It does not examine information 
external to that expressed in the text of the opinions that might impact 
whether an opinion would be written. 1 06 For much the same reason, to the 
extent there is  strategic behavior influencing the content of the opinions, the 
fact that the study may not detect it is not prohibitive. The information stud­
ied is the same information on which institutional and other players in the 
patent system rely every day. Its validity does not decrease through the use 
of a systematic and comprehensive approach to the opinions. Indeed, there 
may be reason to think that such an approach could place outlying opinions 
in relief by showing a doctrinal order and consistency not otherwise easily 
discernable. 
B. Database Construction and Case Selection 
The first step in the study was the construction of the data set. The se­
lection criteria are defined as observable analyses of obviousness under 3 5  
U.S.C. § 1 03 contained i n  Federal Circuit opinions between January 1 ,  1 990, 
and June 1 ,  2005 . 1 07 To identify the data set, several searches of the LEXIS 
1 04. Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the NeH Public Scholarship. 89 MICH.  L. REV. 
792, 80 1 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
1 05 .  See, e.g ,  FED. CIR .  R. 36  ( l isting the conditions under which the Federal Circuit wil l  enter 
a JUdgment of affirmance without an opinion) .  
1 06.  One such external factor would be if  the Federal C ircuit had a policy or target of authoring 
a certain percentage of opinions that affirm, reverse, or vacate. The authors know of no such policy .  
1 07 .  January 1 ,  1 990, was chosen as the starting point for the following reasons: first, to reduce 
the size of the data set to manageable proportions; second, to l imit the term of the study to more 
recent Federal Circuit jurispmdence; and third, to include at least fifteen years of opinions. June 1 ,  
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Federal Circuit database 1 08 were conducted with search te1ms calculated to 
identify all possible opinions falling within the scope of the selection criteria 
above. 1 09 The initial screens identified about 900 cases of potential interest. 
The 900 cases were then screened manually for the presence of a decision on 
the issue of obviousness. Cases directed to the obviousness of design patents 
were excluded, as were cases directed solely to obviousness-type double 
patenting. 1 1 0 When the review was comp leted, 3 62 identified Federal Circuit 
opinions remained. Because the core unit of measurement here was the way 
the Federal C ircuit analyzes obviousness, each observable analysis of obvi­
ousness was a record in the database. Thus, if an opinion analyzed three 
claims with separate obviousness analyses, each of those analyses was 
counted as a separate record. Conversely, if the court analyzed several patent 
claims under the same obviousness analysis, that was counted as a single 
record. Because multiple analyses per opinion are not uncommon (though 
not the norm, either) , the total number of records in the database equaled 
480.  
C. Selecting Measurement Criteria 
For this project, we were interested in gathering information about the 
Federal Circuit ' s  doctrinal performance in the area of obviousness. 
Accordingly, a list of measurement criteria (e .g . ,  database fields) was 
developed, encompassing a list of both the data that were easily obtainable as 
well as data that would be useful for future analyses. The total number of 
fields per record is forty-three. The table in the Appendix identifies each 
field in the data set; what follows is a brief description. 
1. Basic Information.-One set of fields (numbers 1 -20 in the field 
listing in the Appendix) concerns the basic information about a decision of 
the Federal Circuit, such as the title of the case, the judges assigned, the date 
the opinion was issued, and so forth . The database also includes various 
citations, an identification of the opinion below, whether the opinion was 
designated as published or unpublished, whether certiorari was requested, 
and the overall disposition of the appeal. Al l  of these fields were collected 
by computer by parsing the text files of the opinions. 1 1 1  
2. Obviousness-Specific Content.-The balance of the fields (numbers 
2 1 -43 in the field l isting in the Appendix) in the database was human 
· -- ---- ·--·- --··- ·- - -----
2005 .  was chosen as the end point because our initial data gathering began in fal l  2005;  the time lag 
is designed to ensure that all relevant opinions are inc luded in the LEXIS database. 
1 08 .  The LEXIS file name is "CAFC." 
I 09. For example.  the search terms "patent and obvious" were used. 
I I  0 .  Both of  these cases were excluded because the form of obviousness analysis (if conducted 
at a l l )  is not suffic iently comparable to the typical § I 03 analysis to be of use in the data set. 
I l l .  Custom software was developed for this purpose. 
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coded. 1 1 2 As described in  more detai l  below, these fields addressed informa­
tion relating to the Graham factors; secondary considerations; teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation; prior art sources; technological identity of the 
patents or c laims at issue; the depth of analysis; the outcome (e.g. ,  obvious) ; 
and the patent or patent-appl ication numbers associated with the claims at 
iSSUe. 
Information Relating to the Graham Factors (Fields 21�23). In order to 
track the use of the legal factors outlined in Graham v. John Deere-the 
scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the invention and 
the prior art, and the level of ordinary skil l  in the art 1 1 3-the coding scheme 
counted the presence of a discussion of each of these three factors. 
Information Relating to Secondary Considerations (Fields 24-28) .  In  
order to  track the use of the secondary considerations that "may have 
relevancy" 1 1 4 to the obviousness determination, the coding scheme noted 
whether the opinion indicated that the court had applied factors such as 
"long-felt need," "copying," "commercial success," or "unexpected results ." 
The analyses were also coded for how the consideration of secondary factors 
fit within the overal l  obviousness analysis-i.e . ,  which direction it  pointed 
( obvious/nonobvious) and whether i t  was dispositive. 
Information Relating to the Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation Test  
(Fields 29-33) .  Each record analysis was coded for the application of the 
TSM analysis (or lack thereof). As with the secondary considerations, the 
coding inc luded an analysis of how the appl ication of TSM applied: 
dispositive or not, obvious or not. The records were also coded for the 
sources of TSM used-i.e . ,  the c ited references, the knowledge of one of or­
dinary ski l l  in the art, the nature of the problem to be solved, or other 
miscellaneous sources. 
Additional Information (Fields 34-43).  Each record analysis was also 
coded for several other factors, including the technological area of the 
patents or c laims at issue (biotechnological, chemical ,  mechanical,  or 
electronic), the depth of analysis (low, medium, or high), the outcome 
(obvious or nonobvious) ,  whether the obviousness analysis of the lower 
tribunal was changed, the procedural posture of the case, and the patent or 
application numbers associated with the c laims at issue. 
3. Data Collection and Coding Techniques.-The selected cases were 
coded for the measurement criteria described above. As noted, many of the 
fields were coded mechanically via the use of purpose-built software. Where 
1 1 2 .  Coding was accomplished with the use of purpose-built Excel spreadsheets, wherein some 
portions of each record (e .g . ,  the case title and judges )  were blinded (as much as practicable) from 
coders so as to prevent bias. In  addition, pul l-down menus were utilized to minimize data-entry 
errors. 
1 1 3 .  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. C ity, 383  U . S .  1 ,  1 7  ( 1 966) .  
1 14 .  !d. at 1 8 . 
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human coding was conducted, it was performed by the investigators of this 
study, both of whom are attorneys with technical backgrounds, admissions, 
and significant knowledge of Federal Circuit doctrine. 1 1 5 
An important note concerning the structure of this study bears repeating: 
the measurement metric is analyses, not opinions. If  an opinion analyzed 
obviousness for c laims from two different patents, that counted as two 
analyses .  In addition, where different analyses were used for different c laims 
of the same patent (e .g . ,  c laims one through fourteen received an analysis 
distinct from claims fifteen through twenty-one), additional analyses were 
counted. 1 1 6 Dissents or concurrences containing obviousness analyses were 
treated as distinct analyses .  
D. Testingfor Reliability 
Evaluating the reliabil ity of the data collection process is a crucial 
component of studies (such as this  one) based on content analysis. That is,  
because the process of content analysis-reading cases and systematically 
categorizing them according to a defined set of criteria-is inherently subj ect 
to some level of subj ectivity, rigorous efforts must be made to determine the 
rel iabi lity of the coding. 
In this study, reliabi l ity testing of the human coding was conducted 
during two phases. 1 1 7 First, the coding scheme described above was "pilot 
tested" during the initial development of the measurement criteria. This pi lot 
test consisted of each coder (the investigators) coding thirty to fifty cases in 
the data set. The results were compared and evaluated; where app l icable, 
alterations to the coding scheme or the instructions were made. 
The second, more formal test of reliability was conducted concurrently 
with the coding of the data set in  its entirety. The entire data set was coded 
by one coinvestigator over the span of about three weeks . Concurrently and 
independently, the other coinvestigator coded a random sample of 25% of the 
entire data set ( 1 20 records) as a reliability test. 1 1 8 At the conclusion of both 
1 1 5 .  While we took every step to reduce the subj ectivity of the coding, l im iting as strictly as 
possible coding based on "judgment calls" or "impressions," the nature of content coding makes 
nearly impossible the assertion that no subjectivity remains. And while we believe that the results 
of our coding are repl icable by at least some others with similar backgrounds and experience, the 
number of others capable of  doing so may be relatively small .  Given the technological complexity 
and highly factual nature of the many Federal Circuit opinions, it is  quite likely that this study 
requires a degree of legal and technical skill that precludes most law students and non patent lawyers 
from being effective coders. If  so, this is  an unfortunate, albeit inherent, aspect of this approach. 
1 1 6 . In the situation j ust described, two analyses would have been counted. 
1 1 7 .  The machine coding, given its inherent properties, was evaluated (during the development 
of the software) for its abi l ity to return the desired results. 
1 1 8 .  There is  no bright-line standard for the sample size of the rel iabi l ity coding, though 
researchers suggest that at least a ten-percent sample be used. See Stephen Lacy & Daniel Riffe, 
Sampling Error and Selecting lntercoder Reliability Samples for Nominal Content Categories, 7 3  
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM . Q. 963 , 969-73 ( 1 996).  Records used in the rel iabi l i ty coding were 
chosen via computer algorithm based on the generation of random numbers. 
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processes, the results were compared and the level of intercoder agreement 
was tracked and evaluated. Where appl icable, corrections were made to the 
data set. 
The level of intercoder agreement was calculated using Cohen' s  kappa, 
which is a widely accepted statistical measure of the rel iabi lity of content 
analysis conducted by two coders. 1 1 9 Cohen ' s  kappa produces a result on a 
range from zero to one, with higher numbers indicating more intercoder 
agreement (and thus more confidence in the rel iabi lity) . 1 20 While there is no 
formal kappa result that corresponds with rel iab i lity, in general, numbers 
above 0 .90 are considered to be quite strong, numbers above 0. 80 are rea­
sonably strong, and numbers above 0 .70 are acceptable. 1 2 1  
F o r  the data set used in this study, the rel iabi lity o f  each variable was 
measured separately (using Cohen' s  kappa) . In general, the intercoder 
agreement was very good; the kappa statistic ranged from a high of 1 .00 1 22-
indicating complete agreement between the coders-to a low of 0 .66 1 23-
indicating some, but not especially robust, agreement. The results for the 
maj or variables discussed in detail in P art IV are set forth in the table  below. 
F ield Cohen ' s  K Implied Reli abi l ity 
TSM_Appl ication 0.9 1 Very reliable 
Technology 0 .98 Very reliable 
Result 0 .94 Very rel iable  
Disposition 0.95 Very reliable 
Posture 1 .00 Very rel iab le 
1 1 9 .  Jacob Cohen, A Coej icient of Agreement for Nom inal Scales, 20 Eouc. & PSYCHOL. 
M EASUREM ENT 3 7 ( 1 960) .  There are other statistical tests that can be used, and some 
methodologists debate the pros and cons of each. Cohen's  kappa was selected for its relative ease 
of calculation and general acceptance .  See Hall & Wright, supra note 98, at 3 9--40 (noting that the 
most common statistical test i s  Cohen's  kappa) .  
1 20. Cohen's  kappa is  expressed as ,= l�"_-;}, where p" is the proportion of agreed-upon 
judgments, and p, i s  the expected proportion of agreed-upon judgments (those caused by chance) .  
1 2 1 .  See Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-Duch & Cheryl Campanella Bracken, Practical 
Resources for Assessing and Reporting Intercoder Reliabi lity in Content Analysis Research 
Projects, http://www.temple. edu/mmc!reliability (last updated June 1 3 , 2005) .  
1 22 .  TSM_Other ( Field 33 )  and Procedural Posture ( Field 42) .  
1 23 .  Depth (F ie ld  39 ) .  Note that this variable i s  not  used i n  th i s  Article .  
2076 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85 : 205 1 
IV. Results and D iscussion 
The overall goal of this study is to contribute to a burgeoning body of 
literature that addresses the effectiveness of the Federal C ircuit at meeting 
the goals mandated by Congress at the time of the court ' s  creation. 1 24 As we 
described above, 1 25 this is a very complex task that should be undertaken not 
only with considerable effort and expertise, but also deliberately. Ultimately, 
it must involve a broad array of i ssues and topics.  Moreover, in the early 
stages, it should be made as objective as possible. Normative approaches can 
be emiched when they are based on greater information. I t  is for this reason 
that we performed a systematic evaluation of the critical patentabi l ity doc­
trine of obviousness. However, the law of the ultimate determinant of 
patentabil ity is  itself necessarily complicated, and the data set of judicial 
opinions is a rich source of understanding of the nature of the 
jurisprudence-so rich, in fact, that i t  is not the purpose of this Article to 
present and discuss all that this source of informat ion reveals. What is re­
ported here is only a partial p icture, addressing some very timely and 
relevant issues concerning the Federal C ircuit ' s  jurisprudence .  
The data presented in this Part include descriptive statistical information 
collected from the Federal C ircuit database described in Part I I I .  The data 
comprise information pertaining to results, e.g. , result tallying, as well as in­
formation directed to the content of the Federal C ircuit ' s  j urisprudence. B y  
way o f  overview, this Part begins b y  considering the results from the per­
spective of what they show concerning the clarity and stab ility of the 
doctrine, and later moves to those results describing our findings concerning 
the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test. 
A .  The Stability and Clarity of the Doctrine 
Congress, 1 26 the innovation community, and the Supreme Court 1 27 have 
all recognized the importance of doctrinal stabi l ity in the patent law. The 
results of this study provide several measures of doctrinal stab ility, most of 
which seem to suggest a fairly stable and predictable doctrine . 
One measure of stabi lity is the frequency with which an appel late court 
affirms or reverses the judgments of the tribunals it reviews. 1 28 We examined 
the frequency with which the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated 
1 24.  See supra subpart I I (A) .  
1 25 .  See supra Part III. 
1 26.  See supra subpart I I (A ) .  
1 27 .  See Graham v .  John Deere C o .  of Kan. City, 3 8 3  U . S .  I ,  1 8  ( 1 966 ) ( "We bel ieve that strict 
observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that unifonnity and definiteness which 
Congress called for in the 1 952 Act.") .  
1 28 .  As C ircuit Judge Rader noted in dissent from the Federal Circui t ' s  famous C.vbor Corp. v. 
FAS Technologies. Inc , 1 3 8  F . 3d  1 448, 1 4  76 (Fed. Cir. 1 998) ,  opinion " [T)his reversal rate, 
hovering near 50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater 
certainty." 
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the decision of the lower tribunal on the question of obviousness. 1 29 Table 1 
shows the results. 
Table 1 :  Disposition of Analyses in Data Set (n = 480) 
Result 
Affirm 
Reverse 
Vacate 
N 
3 1 2  
1 1 0 
57  
% 
65 .0% 
22.9% 
1 1 . 9% 
These results show that the Federal Circuit authored analyses affirming 
j udgments 65% of the time. On the other side of the ledger, the court re­
versed a judgment only 22.9% of the time . This suggests that for the period 
of the study reviewed tribunals were correctly adjudicating the question of 
obviousness approximately three times for every one time they got it 
wrong. 1 30 Moreover, the observed three-to-one ratio is conservative. Be­
cause of Federal Circuit Rule 3 6, which permits the issuance of j udgments of 
affirmance without opinion, 1 3 1  there are additional cases in which the court 
agreed with the tribunal being reviewed. 1 32 Therefore, the actual number of 
instances where the court affirmed i s  higher. The true ratio thus favors af­
firmances even more strongly. 
If the results of analyses that vacated the reviewed tribunal are included, 
the rate of rej ection of lower court j udgments increases to 34. 8%. 1 3 3  Al­
though we often included deci sions that were vacated, e .g . ,  when p lotting the 
reversal-rate trends in Figure 1 , 1 34 we did so with an eye towards being 
conservative. A Federal Circuit holding vacating a decision on obviousness 
usually indicates that the Federal C ircuit cannot have confidence in the 
j udgment of the lower tribunal, not whether the judgment will ultimately 
prove to be correct. Thus, in some cases where the Federal Circuit vacates a 
j udgment, that judgment will be properly reentered after the Federal Circuit ' s  
guidance is observed, while i n  others a different judgment will b e  entered. 
Whether that should constitute a "reverse," when considering the stabil ity of 
1 29.  This includes a l l  obviousness analyses in the database and thus combines the  disposit ions 
of the PTO, district courts, the Court of Federal C laims. and the ITC. 
1 30 .  I t  should be noted that this requires an assumption that the authors find reasonable. The 
measurement metric for the study is analyses, not claims, cases, or patents. Thus, one must assume 
that the number of analyses/opinions reversing a judgment is, on the whole, close to the same as the 
number of analyses/opinions affirming a judgment. 
1 3 1 .  FED. CIR. R. 36 .  
1 32 .  See, e.g . In re Kretchman, 1 25 F .  App 'x 1 0 1 2, 1 0 1 2  ( Fed. C ir. 2005 ) ( affirming, with 
Rule 36, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' reJection of the applicant ' s  c laims for 
obviousness ) .  
1 33 .  See supra Table ! .  
1 34.  See infra Figure I .  
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the doctrine, is a matter that can be debated. 1 3 5  It does show some kind of 
difficulty at the lower tribunal in managing the issue of obviousness .  I t  is 
reasonable to think that in at least some cases this is a consequence of doc­
trinal confusion, although there may be nondoctrinal reasons as well .  Having 
presented both sides, we will leave readers to form their own j udgments . 
Whether a reader prefers the view of 22 .9% (reverse) or 34 . 8% (reverse or 
vacate) ,  the number of cases affirmed was stil l  65 .0%, which even standing 
alone suggests some success in achieving stabi lity and clarity in the doctrine. 
We note that the interpretation of the meaning of reversal rates by 
appellate courts is, as we have described elsewhere, an uncertain exercise at 
best. 1 36 Indeed, in our earlier analysis of the claim-construction doctrine, we 
expressed doubts concerning the causal l ink between reversal rates and the 
Federal Circuit ' s  doctrinal performance . 1 37 This is because a reversal rate is 
determined by many variables, including the performance of lower tribunals, 
decisions by parties on whether or not to appeal, etc .-making the link be­
tween a measured rate of reversals and the court ' s  performance  difficult to 
determine. In this case, while our general skepticism remains, we do bel ieve 
that the reversal rates for obviousness analysis provide significant 
information. First, we can compare the reversal rate of obviousness analyses 
to measures of baseline rates of reversals in other patent cases. Second, 
given the information we earl ier reported concerning claim construction­
where we, in essence, found a link between high reversal rates and doctrinal 
confusion-we have something of a comparative baseline for obviousness. 
Third, the reversal rate analysis directly addresses the criticism that the 
Federal Circuit has used the obviousness analysis (especially the TSM test) 
as a tool to dominate lower tribunals .  So although we are cautious in our 
claims that the reversal rates demonstrate a solid causal link to Federal 
Circuit doctrinal performance, we think that in these c ircumstances the value 
of reporting and analyzing them easily offsets their potential to confuse the 
question. 
In this regard, we find that the l ikelihood of the court to reverse on the 
question of obviousness compares favorably to the court ' s  likelihood to 
reverse across all issues. One study p laces the l ikelihood of the Federal 
C ircuit to reverse in written opinions across all issues in patent cases at 
47 . 3% . 1 38 The lower incidence of reversals (or reversals and vacates) in 
obviousness analysis suggests-at the very least-that the Federal Circuit ' s  
1 3 5 .  For example, 3 5 %  o f  summary JUdgments were vacated. See infi'a Table 2 .  A s  the 
accompanying discussion notes, this number may well reflect gambling in view of the e conomics of 
litigation and efforts to modify the law rather than a lack of stabil ity, or even uncertainty, in the law. 
1 3 6 .  See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7 ,  at 1 1 27-28 .  
1 3 7 .  Id 
\ 3 8 .  See Chu, supra note 4, at 1 097-99 (reporting the results of a study on the Federal C ircuit ' s  
reversal rate o n  all issues in patent cases that covered a twenty-eight month period between January 
1 998 and April 2000 ) .  
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doctrinal stabil ity i s  no worse (and may well be better) than for many other 
issues in patent law. 1 39 
L ikewise, the court ' s  performance on obviousness i s  notable in view of 
reported reversal rates for other areas of its jurisprudence. Considering the 
issue of claim interpretation, Chu reports that the Federal C ircuit found error 
in a district court ' s  claim interpretation approaching 5 0% of the time. 1 40 
Moore reports that over a period of four years and eight months in the mid-
1 990s, "[ d] istrict court judges decided at least one claim construction issue 
wrong in 33% of all appealed patent cases . " 1 4 1  Circuit Judge Rader calcu­
lated that in 1 997, the year before the Federal C ircuit ' s  Cybor decision, the 
Federal C ircuit reversed almost "40% of all claim constructions." 1 42 Thus, in 
v iew of the court ' s  performance with respect to c laim interpretation, the 
court ' s  performance in the area of obviousness doctrine reflects somewhat 
greater predictability and certainty. 
In light of the frequency with which the court reversed or vacated lower 
tribunals, we examined how these results were distributed over time. To get 
a perspective of the overall  reversal rate over time, we calculated a twenty­
analysis lagged average of cases that were e ither reversed or vacated for the 
entire data set. The results are depicted in Figure 1 below. 
1 39 .  L ike the 22.9% reversal rate that we find, the 47.3% reversal rate reported by Chu does not 
take into account cases affirmed under Rul e  36 .  Chu finds that Rule 36 affirmances accounted for 
the disposition of one-fifth of the patent cases during the twenty-eight month period. Including this 
information, Chu finds that the overall reversal rate for the period studied was 3 6. 6%.  !d. at 1 099-
1 00.  A separate study examining the Federal C ircuit ' s  reversal rate over al l  issues reports a 22% 
reversal rate for district court patent cases. See Kimberly A.  Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent 
Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 M ICH . L .  REV. 365 ,  396-97 ( 2000) ( reporting 
reversal rates from 1 993- 1 998 ) .  While this rate seems to align c losely with the 22 .9% rate that we 
report for the individual issue of obviousness, the 22.0% rate reported by Moore is arrived at very 
differently than the values reported here and those reported by Chu. For example, the Moore rate 
excludes data from appeals from the Patent O ffice while taking into account summary affirmance. 
See id. at 3 80 ( reporting that the data for the study derived from compilations provided by the 
Administrative O ffice of the U.S .  Courts consisting of "a population of tried cases from 1 98 3  to 
1 999") ;  id. at 396 ( stating that the data represents "district court reversal rates for all cases appealed 
to the Federal C ircuit" (emphasis added) ) .  Including appeals from the Patent O ffice provides a 
more complete p icture of the Federal Circuit ' s  treatment of the doctrine, while excluding appeals 
that were summarily affirmed would increase the rate reported. Thus, perhaps the most that can be 
said regarding obviousness based on the 22% reversal rate evident in the Moore sh1dy is that, 
excluding appeals from the PTO, the Federal C ircuit ' s  overall reversal rate for obviousness that we 
report i s  s imilar to the rate at which the court reverses district courts in  all patent cases. Overall, we 
think this suggests substantial stabi l ity in  the doctrine of obviousness, for it does not differ 
substantially from the court's reversal rate across all issues (and the court decides a great number of 
other issues) .  
1 40 .  However, the error was not outcome determinative in a l l  cases. See Chu, supra note 4, at 
1 1 00-03 .  
1 4 1 .  Kimberly A. Moore, A re District Court Judges Equipped ro Resolve Parent Cases ?, I S  
HARV. J.L. & TECH. I ,  1 1  (200 1 )  
142 .  Cybor Corp .  v .  FAS Techs. ,  Inc . ,  1 38 F .3d 1 448,  1 476 ( Fed. C ir. 1 998 )  ( Rader, J . ,  
concurring in the judgment) .  
2080 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85 :205 1 
Figure 1 :  Overall Reversal-Rate Trend in Obviousness Analyses at the 
Federal C ircuit 1 43 
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Figure 1 reveals that the moving rate at which the Federal Circuit was 
likely to reverse or vacate a trial court remained fairly steady over the last 
fifteen years. This tends to suggest some level of doctrinal stab il ity, 
particularly in view of the fact that the overall frequency of the court either 
reversing or vacating the lower tribunal was 34 . 8%, a value that aligns very 
well with the lagging rate throughout the course of the study. 
The cases presenting the analyses that were the basis of the study came 
from a variety of procedural backgrounds. F igure 2 below shows the 
distribution of procedural backgrounds of the analyses that formed the data 
set for the study. 
1 4 3 .  The ordinate represents a twenty-analysis lagged average of the percentage of analyses 
reversed or vacated, p lotted against the number of analyses. On the abscissa, the analysis number 
moves from left to right ( 1 990-2005 ) .  The trendline superimposed on the graph has an / = 0 .0 1 3 , 
t-obs = 2 .500, which indicates statistical s igni ficance at the p = 0.050 leveL 
2007] The Federal C ircuit and Patentability 208 1 
F igure 2 :  Overall Distribution of Analyses B ased on Procedural Posture 
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Figure 2 shows that the Federal C ircuit most frequently authored an 
obviousness analysis when it was addressing an appeal from the Patent 
Office (4 1 . 8% of the analyses) .  Analyses from summary judgments, bench 
trials, and jury trials were all observed with a very similar frequency ( 1 4 .4%, 
1 8 . 6%, and 24.6%, 1 44 respectively) .  
The question of obviousness is  one of law. However as set forth 
above, 145 the doctrine has important factual underpinnings . 1 46 One potential 
measure of the factual influence on a doctrine is an inquiry into the level of 
deference a reviewing court gives to the reviewed tribunal. One way to 
probe the level of deference is to examine the l ikelihood that the appellate 
tribunal will affirm or reverse depending on the posture of the case. Table 2 
presents the dispositions shown in the court ' s  analyses distributed m 
accordance with the procedural postures dominant in the study. 
1 44.  The number for analyses after j ury trials is the sum of JMOL-denied + JMOL-granted = 
1 9 .8% + 4 .8% = 24.6%. 
1 45 .  See supra section I l ( B ) (  I ) . 
1 46.  For example, the Graham factors are viewed by the Federal C ircuit as questions of fact. 
McGinley v.  Franklin Sports, Inc . ,  262 F .3d  1 339, 1 349 (Fed Cir. 200 1 )  So  too, whether the prior 
art contains within it a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine is also a question of fact .  In 
re Lee, 2 7 7  F .3d 1 338 ,  1 342-43 ( Fed. C ir. 2002 ) .  
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Table 2 :  Procedural Posture Versus Dispositions (n = 480) 
Affirmed Reversed Vacated 
Bench Trial 75 .3% 1 5 .7% 9.0% 
JMOL-denied 8 1 . 1 %  1 2 .6% 6.3 %  
JMOL-granted 47 .8% 43 .5% 8 .7% 
PTO 64. 1 %  2 8 . 8% 7. 1 %  
Summary 
39 .7% 2 5 .0% 3 5 . 3 %  
Judgment 
The results of Table 2 suggest that, consistent with the Supreme Court ' s  
guidance in  Graham, the doctrine has deeply factual foundations . The results 
show that the Federal C ircuit was substantially more l ikely to affirm a lower 
tribunal ' s  decision on the question of obviousness if it engaged in fact­
finding. When a bench trial was held, the Federal Circuit was likely to 
affirm 75 .3%147 of the time. The rate was even higher (8 1 . 1 %) 148  for cases 
that had been given to a jury and judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) had 
not been granted. Patent Office adjudication fared only slightly worse than 
trials in courts. 1 49 And, as one might expect, where an analysis is highly fact 
dependent, the court reversed or vacated summary judgments on the question 
147 .  The Federal Circui t ' s  performance when reviewing an obviousness dete1mination 
fol lowing a bench trial is consistent with what others have observed for the court ' s  review of bench 
trials across all issues. See Moore, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 1 7  (reporting an affirmance rate of 77% for 
bench trials on the i ssue of validity ) .  Chu reports affirmance rates for bench trials across al l  i ssues 
for his twenty-eight-month study that are somewhat Jess at 56%. See Chu, supra note 4 ,  at 1 1 5 2  
tbl .B-2.  The three most probable explanations for the difference between Chu and Moore are the 
time periods examined, their comparative breadth, and the presence of claim-construction data in 
the rate reported by Chu. 
1 48 .  The numbers of our study are harder to compare to this rate, as prior studies have not 
distinguished between cases where the district judge enters judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or 
otherwise as a matter of law, and cases where the trial judge does not. However, the numbers are 
generally consistent. For jury trials Moore reports an affirmance rate for validity issues of 78%.  
Moore, supra note 1 4 1 ,  a t  1 7 . Chu reports j ury affirmance frequency for "Jury trial or JMOLs" 
across al l  issues for h is  twenty-eight-month study that i s  "somewhat less at 45%." Chu, supra note 
4, at 1 1 52 tbl .B-2. There are at least four possible explanations for this. One is  the different 
sampl ing periods. Another is the comparative breadth of the studies. A third is that, as Chu 
explains, all reviews of a judgment fol lowing a j ury trial ( including JMOL-granted) are inc luded in 
the 45% number. Finally, a fourth is  the presence of c laim-construction data in the rate reported by 
Chu. 
1 49. Chu reports a frequency of affirmance of 56%. Chu, supra note 4, at 1 1 52 tbl .  B-2. 
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of obviousness over 60% of the time . Note that the court reversed or vacated 
JMOL-granted judgments 52 .3% of the t ime, suggesting, by this measure at 
least, that the court may be wary of j udgments where a lower court has taken 
the fact-finding function from the jury. 
The examination of the functionality of the Federal C ircuit ' s  approach 
to different dispositions provides another measure of the stabi l ity and clarity 
of the doctrine of obviousness. The cases that parties put on presumably re­
flect their understanding of the relevant legal principles. These 
understandings in tum influence the trial body ' s  understanding of the law and 
are reflected in the evidence presented to the j ury. They also affect jury 
instructions, the trial body ' s  discretionary case management, and the 
l ikelihood that the court wil l  grant JMOL. I f  the law i s  wel l  understood and 
transparent, there should be l ittle to complain about for the losing party other 
than the contention that the fact  finder took an erroneous view of the facts. 
Consistent with general principles of appellate rev iew, appel late courts do 
not retry facts; instead, they apply some level of deference to the determina­
tions of the fact finder. Thus, with a fact-dependent doctrine such as 
obviousness, one should expect that a clearer, more stable doctrine wil l  pro­
duce a relatively low reversal rate. On the other hand, where the l aw is not 
clear or stable, on review, the appellate court should more frequently find 
evidentiary decisions improperly made, j ury instructions inadequate or 
erroneous, or cases simply lacking evidence sufficient to support their 
outcome. Accordingly, one measure of the clarity and stabi lity of the Federal 
C ircuit ' s  jurisprudence on obviousness is the frequency with which the court 
reverses the judgments of lower tribunals after the issues have been fully 
aired in the context of the purported governing law. Unless the court is nor­
mally unable to discern the correct application of the law and in  such cases 
will  affirm as a default, the less l ikely the court is to reverse, the more l ikely 
it is that the doctrine is  c lear and stable .  
Table 2 shows that the Federal C ircuit affirmed the j udgment entered 
after a bench trial 75 .3% of the time and affirmed the conclusions of a jury 
8 1 . 1 %  of the time . This is suggestive that the doctrinal law of obviousness is  
both stable and c lear. As the Supreme Court made clear in  Graham, the in­
quiry into the question of obviousness is deeply factual . 1 50 The breadth of 
the factual inquiry, the l ikel ihood that any of a variety of factors can influ­
ence the ultimate detennination, and the many moving parts of the 
obviousness inquiry are all good indicators that there will  often be genuine 
issue(s) of material fact that wil l  need to be resolved before a judgment of 
obvious or nonobvious can be rendered. 
The conclusion that the doctrine of obviousness is relatively clear and 
stable is not inconsistent with the results concerning summary j udgment. 
First of all, as noted above, the doctrine of obviousness is deeply factual, and 
1 50.  Graham v. John Deere Co.  of Kan. C ity, 383  U .S .  I ,  1 7- 1 8  ( 1 966). 
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a variety of different facts can affect the ultimate judgment. With a higher 
l ikel ihood of material  facts and a rule that permits those facts to come from 
sources as textually unsupported as testimony concerning the knowledge and 
skil l  in the art, it is increasingly l ikely that genuine issues of material fact 
will exist in a case. Naturally, this makes it Jess likely for summary j udg­
ment to be appropriate on the issue of obviousness .  1 5 1 
Thus, the result seen in Table 2,  that the Federal Circuit affirms only 
39 .7% of summary judgments, is consistent with the existence of a highly 
factual doctrine . Moreover, the low affinnance levels are not necessarily 
strong indicators of instability or lack of clarity . Obviousness requires a 
complicated and highly technical trial-a situation that is only exaggerated 
as more patent law issues are presented in a case. The economics of sum­
mary judgment often encourage the parties, and perhaps even more 
enthusiastically the lower courts, 1 52 to attempt summary judgment. 1 53 Thus, 
one l ikely explanation for the court ' s  low affirmance rates for summary 
judgments on the issue of obviousness is that we are seeing the court in one 
of its other congressionally envisioned roles-the doctrinal enforcer. 
When summary judgment cannot be easily achieved on the facts of a 
case, another approach for litigants or courts is to attempt to modify the law. 
This approach has the promise of attenuating any legally required fact­
finding by the interposition of layers of dispositive questions that either 
eliminate certain facts from the realm of materiality or, alternatively, make 
dispositive those facts that are undisputed. In l ight of the Federal C ircuit ' s  
strong tendency to affirm after a trial, and given the economics  o f  summary 
judgment, it is quite possible that what Table 2 shows is the Federal C ircuit 
repell ing attempts to modify the functional approach set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Graham. 
1 5 1 .  The critical reader should note that this s ituation could be expected to be amplified as 
TSM is  used more frequently. See infi·a subpart IV( B )  ( describing the increased use of TSM) .  It i s  
a logical result of the Federal Circui t ' s  requinng evidence of T S M  to establ i sh obviousness. See 
supra section I I (  B ) ( ! ) .  Assuming that the textual TSM i s  a relatively rare event, TSM must come 
from other sources. One common source is expert testimony describing the relevant scope, content, 
knowledge, and ski l l  in the relevant art. To sustain summary judgment, the nonmo vant would have 
to do little more than secure an expet1 who would contest the movant's  expert ' s  interpretation or 
description of the art. 
1 52 .  There may be other reasons as well . The first is the presumption of validity. See 3 5  
U . S .  C .  § 282 (2000) ( " A  patent shall b e  presumed valid . ' ' ) .  I f  the lower cout1 i s  going t o  guess, it 
might well align its guess with the relevant presumptions. Secondly, those with a high level  o f  
knowledge of the doctrine are probably aware that i t  i s  sometimes perceived ( usually erroneously) 
that there may be subrules that prohibit an obvious finding, and perhaps fewer perceived subrules 
( in light of Graham ) that direct toward a finding of obviousness. It is  probably not uncommon for 
particularly inexperienced lower courts to become convinced that such subrules ex ist . Al though, i f  
true, such a phenomenon suggests a t  least some lack of  clarity in the doctrine. 
1 53 .  See Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Den): Summw}' 
Judgment in the Era oj' Manageriaf Judging, 3 1  HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 1 ,  1 20-2 1 ( 2002 ) ( discussing 
the various structural economic incentives in favor of  granting summary judgment ) .  
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There are other reasons to think this is l ikely true. One way to examine 
the stress on the doctrine as a whole,  as well as the Federal C ircuit ' s  role in 
policing it, would be to examine the rate at which the court reversed or va­
cated summary judgment over time. This is shown in Figure 3 below. 
lim\ 
I� 
Figure 3 :  Reversal Rate of Summary Judgments 1 54 
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The results in Figure 3 reveal that the Federal C ircuit dramatically 
increased the rate at which it reversed or vacated a summary judgment 
throughout the period studied. This may suggest that, during the course of 
the study, the doctrine came under increasing pressure. If so, these data may 
reveal that the Federal C ircuit has rigorously and consistently rebuffed ef­
forts to e liminate or reduce the factual quality of the inquiry. This is 
potentially a prime example of the Federal C ircuit p laying exactly the role 
envisioned for it. On the other hand, stress placed on the doctrine in this 
matter may reflect some degree of lack of clarity or instabil ity. If, for 
example, parties and lower tribunals really thought that summary judgment 
was legally appropriate, and these appeals were not attempts to be miserly 
with respect to party and judicial resources, it could suggest that the Federal 
Circuit is miscommunicating the doctrine to some degree. Moreover, what 
seems to be an increasing requirement by the court for input from fact finders 
154 .  The ordinate represents a ten-analysis lagged average of the percentage of analyses 
reversed or vacated, plotted against the number of analyses. On the abscissa, the analysis number 
moves from left to right ( 1 990-2005 ) The trend line superimposed on the graph has a / = 0. 74, t­
ohs = 1 2 .87,  which indicates stati st ical s ignificance at the p = 0.0 I level. 
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could reflect that the court has l imited the legal component of the obvious 
inquiry so that it i s  now very thin. 
� - -The Patent Office reversal rate )) was lower than expected. However, 
during the period of the study, the Federal C ircuit altered its standard of re­
view of PTO fact-finding in obviousness cases from "clear error" to 
"substantial evidence," 1 56 which is perceived as more deferential .  In an effort 
to better understand the temporal nature of the likelihood of reversal at the 
PTO during the period studied, we examined the moving reversal rate. This 
is  depicted in F igure 4. 
F igure 4 :  Reversal Rate of Patent Office Obviousness Analyses 1 5 7  
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Figure 4 reveals that the rate at which the Federal Circuit was l ikely to 
reverse or vacate the Patent Office decreased over the course of the study. 
As the informed reader is aware, nearly every obviousness decision of the 
PTO that is reviewed by the Federal C ircuit is a decision by the Board of 
Patent Appeals and I nterferences that the disputed c laims are obvious. B e­
cause of the posture of the appeals, the c lear inference from this is that the 
PTO is more accurately determining that c laims are obvious. 
The fact that the PTO has fared better at establ ishing obviousness tends 
to suggest that the law of obviousness is getting clearer-or at least that it is 
1 55 ,  See supra Table 2 (showing a 28 ,8% reversal rate ) ,  
1 56,  In r e  Gartside, 203 F ,3d  1 305 ,  1 308, 1 3 1 1 - 1 5  ( Fed. CiL 2000) 
1 57.  As in Figure 1 ,  the ordinate represents a twenty-analysis lagged average o f  the percentage 
of analyses reversed or vacated, plotted against the number of analyses. On the abscissa, the 
analysis number moves from left to right ( 1 990-2005 ). The trend l ine superimposed on the graph 
has an / = 0. 1 3 , t-abs = 5 . 14 ,  which is statistically significant to a level of p = 0 .0  I .  
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getting no less clear. In particular, the increased success of the B oard sug­
gests that it is developing a better understanding of when c laims are obvious, 
developing a better understanding of how to articulate that determination in 
its opinions in a manner that is less l ikely to cause the court to think that the 
Board has erred, or both. Because the source of the Board ' s  guidance on 
how to identify and define obvious claims i s  the jurisprudence of the Federal 
Circuit, one inference is that the court has communicated to the Board how to 
more effectively identify and establish obvious c laims . 
Given that the Federal Circuit has been roundly criticized for weakening 
the standards of patentabi l ity, 1 58 we examined the frequency with which the 
court reached either an obvious or a nonobvious outcome. Table 3 shows the 
frequency with which the court held c laims either obvious or nonobvious. 
Table 3 :  Results of Obviousness Decisions (Excludes 
Vacated Dispositions, n = 422) 
Result N % 
Obvious 244 57 .8% 
Nonobvious 1 78 42.2% 
Here we found that Federal C ircuit review resulted in an outcome of 
obvious 57 .8% 1 59 of the time. This is  a clear majority of the analyses. Note 
that to accommodate the fact that a result was still pending in fifty-seven de­
cisions where the court vacated a judgment on obviousness ,  we excluded 
those results from the calculations underlying Table 3 .  We did not fol low the 
ultimate disposition of the vacated cases. At least one did return for Federal 
C ircuit review, 1 60 and the disposition was therefore eventually captured, but 
the quantity of cases returning appears to be quite low. In any event, given 
the nature of the coding, there is  l ittle reason to think the return of a case 
from remand could have any significant distortive impact on the study 
results. 
At least one reported study has concluded that at the Federal C ircuit 
"obviousness has become particularly disfavored." 1 6 1 In view of that study, 
1 58 .  St!e. e.g. . supra notes 1 0- 1 3  and accompanying text. 
1 59 .  The 57 .8 '% obvious outcome number is  surprising in that it i s  achieved in the face of the 
law's presumption of validity, which can only be overcome by c lear and convincing evidence. See 
35  U.S .C .  � 282 (2000) ( "A patent shal l  be presumed valid.");  Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu 
Elccs .. Inc .. 298 F.2d 82, 86 ( 9th Cir. 1 96 1 )  ("A presumption of validity, which can only be 
overcome by c lear and convinc ing proof, arises from the issuance of a patent."). 
1 60. Compare Ruiz v.  A.B. Chance Co.,  234 F.3d 654 ( Fed. Cir. 2000), with Ruiz v.  A.B .  
Chance Co . 3 5 7  F .3d 1 270, 1 276 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
1 6 1 .  Lunney, supra note 7 1 ,  at 3 74. 
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the high frequency of obvious outcomes observed here was a bit of a 
surprise. Having reached an outcome of obvious nearly 60% of the time that 
it tested the issue, the Federal Circuit seems to have l ittle problem finding 
c laims obvious . 
There are several differences between the two studies that make 
comparing them difficult. F or example, the study reported here looked at 
Federal Circuit opinions from 1 990-2005, while the prior study looked at 
Federal Circuit dec isions for two separate two-year periods, one occurring 
before the period addressed by the study reported here . 1 62 I n  addition, this 
study compares neither the ratio of obviousness to overall invalidity nor the 
Federal Circuit ' s  obvious outcomes to the obvious outcomes reached by the 
regional circuits. However, the fact that the Federal Circuit reaches an obvi­
ous outcome nearly 60% of the time that it addresses the issue seems at least 
somewhat inconsistent with the notion that the importance of obviousness is 
on the wane. 
There are several ways that the results from these two studies can 
comfortably coexist. Perhaps the most straightforward-and consistent with 
the results of this study-is that the law of obviousness has gotten clearer. It 
may be just as important, but parties are better able to judge whether to liti­
gate or appeal the question. This would reduce the likel ihood that it appears 
as a decided issue in a Federal C ircuit opinion. It would also explain the 
comparatively low rate of reversal on the i ssue at the Federal C ircuit de­
scribed above . 1 63 If so, the ratio relative to other doctrines with which 
obviousness appears in Federal C ircuit opinions may not be decisive on the 
importance of the doctrine or whether it is disfavored. 1 64 To the contrary, it 
is at least equally l ikely evidence of the Federal Circui t ' s  success in cleaning 
1 6 -up the doctrine. ) 
1 62 .  It also is at least possible that the 1 994- 1 995 information could be cotTect for that period, 
but because of the size of the sample, a relatively poor reflection of the overal l  activity o f  
obviousness a t  the Federal Circuit. 
1 63 .  Note that this rate i s  even lower when the issue is  tried. See supra Table 2 .  
1 64.  Another possible explanation is  that parties prefer to use other doctrines t o  inval idate 
patents when they can. Anticipation is  conceptually simpler, making it  easier to explain to a j udge 
or jury. As fields get crowded and patenting becomes heavy, i t  may be more l ikely that there is 
anticipatory at1. I f, as i s  generally thought, the P atent Office does a poor job at l ocating prior art, 
"real" prior art searching may await l itigation. Then, it may be learned that there is  anticipatory art, 
and the case is l it igated on that issue. Also, other doctrines may have ascended over time. 
1 65 .  One of the reasons it  was thought that the Federal C ircuit was needed was the high rate of 
regional c ircuit invalidity that Professor L unney documents. See supra subpart I I (A) .  Other studies 
address the rate of invalidity before the creation of the Federal Circuit. See American Patent 
System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Cop)'Tights of the S. Comm. 
on the Judicimy, 84th Cong. 1 76-85 ( 1 956) (statement of P .J .  Federico) (reporting that from 1 948 
to 1 954, the percentage of patents found valid and infringed in the circuit courts of appeals was 1 8% 
when patents counted more than once were excluded); GLORIA K. KOENIG,  PATENT INVALI DITY: A 
STATIST ICAL AND S UBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-4 1 (rev. ed. 1 980) (reporting a l ikelihood of 
noninvalidity before the creation of the Federal C ircuit of around 3 5%) ;  see also Jungerson v. Ostby 
& Barton Co , 3 3 5  U . S .  560, 572 ( Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he only patent that i s  val id  is one 
which this Court has not been able to get its hands on."). 
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Yet another way to measure stabil ity is across the varying technologies 
that are reflected in the cases for which the court authors analyses. The 
structure of the study permits the examination of the Federal C ircuit ' s  per­
formance based on the technology involved in the analyses. The overall 
distribution of analyses based on technology is shown in Figure 5. 
F igure 5 :  Frequency of Analyses Involving Particular Technologies 
Tethnology Breakdown 
Ob•iovsn"s lno\ylos Of '�' Fedorol Circuit, 1 990-1005 
[ � � +!•l ! 
F igure 5 captures the entire data set and shows the distribution of 
analyses authored by the Federal Circuit based on technology. As is 
apparent, a majority of the cases involved the mechanical arts (63.0%), while 
the chemical and electronic arts were relatively s imi larly represented ( 1 5 . 1 %  
and 1 3 . 1  %, respectively) . The biotechnological arts were the least prevalent 
in Federal C ircuit obviousness analyses, comprising only 8 . 8% of the analy­
ses present in the data set. 
To investigate whether the Federal Circuit dispropmiionatel y  finds 
claims pertaining to certain arts nonobvious, we examined the frequency 
distribution of results based on the identity of the aJi involved in the analysis. 
Table 4 shows the distribution. 
2090 Texas Law Review 
Table 4:  Technology Versus Results (Excludes 
Vacated Dispositions, n = 422) 
Obvious Nonobvious 
Bio 5 8.3% 4 1 . 7% 
Chemical 5 8.7% 4 1 .3% 
Electronic 46 .9% 5 3 . 1 %  
Mechanical 5 7. 1 %  42.9% 
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As noted above, in the study as a whole, the mechanical ,  chemical, 
electronic, and biotechnological arts were distributed at frequencies of 
63 .0%, 1 5. 1 %, 1 3 . 1 %, and 8.8%, respectively. 1 66 As Table 4 shows, when 
we asked whether the disposition of these analyses were obvious or 
nonobvious, we discovered a nearly uniform distribution of  obvious and 
nonobvious outcomes between the mechanical (57 . 1 %  obvious/42.9% 
nonobvious) ,  chemical (58 .7% obvious/4 1 .3% nonobvious) ,  and biotechno­
logical arts (58 .3% obvious/4 1 .7% nonobvious). The electronic arts differed 
somewhat, showing 46.9% obvious outcomes and 5 3 . 1 %  nonobvious 
outcomes. With the possible exception of the electronic arts ,  these results are 
pretty self-explanatory. Federal C ircuit analyses of different technologies 
lead to the same frequency of obvious dispositions. This is consistent with 
the overall frequency of an obvious disposition, which is 57 .8 %. 1 67 Thus, 
although these categories are clearly quite general, these results are consis­
tent with the basic idea that the court has developed a generally stable and 
consistent doctrine. 
In sum, the weight of the evidence suggests that the Federal Circuit has 
been fulfilling Congress ' s  promise to develop an obviousness  doctrine that 
reduces uncertainty. The Federal Circuit ' s  frequency of reversal is not the 
"worst possible" 50% and comp ares favorably to its activity in other areas of 
the doctrine. 1 68 Moreover, the court ' s  reversal rate on the issue of  obvious­
ness has remained steady throughout the course of the study. 1 69 As might be 
expected for a highly factually complex doctrine, summary j udgment is 
rarely affirmed, but jury trials and bench trials are affirmed over three­
quariers of the time . 1 70 In addition, the rate at which the Federal Circuit 
reverses the Patent Office has declined, suggesting that one of the patent 
system' s  most important institutional players is getting better at identifying 
and rej ecting obvious claims.  When one additionally considers that the cou1i 
is more likely to reach an outcome of obvious as opposed to an outcome of 
1 66.  See supra Figure 5 .  
1 67 .  See supra Table 3 .  
1 68 .  See supra Table 1 and accompanying discussion. 
1 69.  See supra F igure J .  
1 70.  See supra Table 2 .  
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nonobvious, the data suggest both that the court does not have a "pro­
patentee" bias on the question of obviousness and that lower tribunals are 
capable of establishing the obviousness of disputed claims . 
B. The Relationship Between TSM and Obviousness 
As noted above, 1 7 1  a considerable controversy has arisen concerning the 
Federal C ircuit ' s  interpretation of the statutory requirement that the 
obviousness inquiry be temporally located "at the time the invention was 
made." 1 72 I n  particular, the interpretation requires an evidentiary showing 
that, more l ikely than not, somewhere within the prior art there is information 
that provides a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to col lect and arrange dis­
parate pieces of prior art to meet the c laimed subject matter. 
Given this controversy, we examined the application of TSM 
throughout the course of the study. As discussed in more detail below, the 
results were revealing, showing that TSM has no apparent effect on the l ike­
lihood of the Federal Circuit to affirm and l ittle to no apparent effect on the 
l ikelihood of the court to reach an obvious disposition. Moreover, as we de­
scribe below, the results show that while the application of TSM has 
increased over the course of the study, the rate of a nonobvious outcome for 
cases involving the application of TSM decl ined. 
To investigate the effect of the Federal C ircuit ' s  TSM test on its overall 
obviousness jurisprudence, we first examined the frequency with which the 
application of TSM corresponded to a reversal of the lower tribunal . 
Table 5 :  Disposition Versus Application of TSM Analysis (n = 480) 
Affirm 
Reverse 
Vacate 
TSM A lies 
65 . 3% 
2 1 . 3% 
1 3 .4% 
TSM Does N ot A 
65 .0% 
24 .3% 
1 0 . 6% 
Table 5 shows that the Federal Circuit reversed the lower tribunal 
2 1 . 3% of the time when TSM applied. This rate of reversal was very similar 
to the rate of reversal observed when TSM was not a feature of the Federal 
Circuit ' s  analysis (24 . 3%) .  In addition, TSM was not observed to substan­
tial ly alter the frequency with which the court was l ikely to vacate a 
judgment during the period studied. 1 73 One of the most interesting features 
of thi s observation is that the court affirms quite frequently (65 .3%) when 
1 7 1 .  See supra subpart I l (B ) .  
1 72 .  3 5  U . S . C .  § 1 03 (a)  (2000) 
1 73 .  See supra Table 5 (noting a less than 3% difference in the frequency of vacating 
judgments between when TSM applies and when it does not). 
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TSM applies, a frequency of affirmance that is not appreciably different from 
analyses that did not feature TSM (65 . 0%) .  
Table 6 :  TSM Analysis Versus Results (Excludes 
Vacated Dispositions, n = 1 87) 
Obvious Nonobvious 
TSM Applies 52 .4% 47 .6% 
Table 6 shows the distribution of an obvious or nonobvious outcome in 
analyses that showed a TSM analysis. 
By comparing Tables 3 and 6, it appears that the presence of  TSM in  an 
analysis slightly decreased the frequency with which the court reached an 
obvious disposition. The Federal C ircuit reached an obvious disposition for 
the entire data set 5 7 . 8% of the time, 1 74 while reaching an obvious disposition 
a slightly lower 52.4% of the time in cases that showed a T S M  analysis . 1 75 
The similarity of these two results suggests that the overall rate of obvious 
outcomes has not been strongly affected by the presence of TSM in the 
doctrine. 
This was true even though the rate of application of TSM steadily rose 
throughout the period studied. F igure 6 shows the rate at which TSM was 
featured in Federal Circuit opinions during the period studied. 
---- · -- · · - --- -- - ------ ---- - -
1 74. See supra Table 3 .  
1 75 .  See supra Table 6 .  
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Figure 6: Rate of Application of TSM 1 76 
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Figure 6 c learly shows that, as measured by Federal Circuit obviousness 
analyses, TSM is gaining in prominence as a part of the doctrine. The results 
presented here do not definitively show why this is true and there may be a 
number of reasons, none of which need be independent. F or example, the 
TSM test may be an obj ective standard on which district courts, the Patent 
Office, and litigants feel they can hang their hats . If TSM can be proved, 
obviousness is established. If it can be refuted, a nonobvious result is more 
likely to be obtained. Moreover, in regard to the Patent Office, these results 
provide support for this proposition. F igure 4 shows that the reversal rate for 
appeals originating at the PTO declined over the same period during which 
the application of TSM was increasing. One reason for this may be that TSM 
provides a l inguistic formulation that examiners and the Board can use to 
state their arguments for obviousness. If  so,  such improved clarity may be a 
very useful road map for establishing obviousness.  
Another reason that TSM could be gaining prominence is the 
disposition of and force with which the Federal Circuit has authored a few of 
its TSM opinions . 1 77 Another reason still may be the academic outcry, which 
1 76 .  Here, the ordinate represents a twenty-analysis  lagged average of the percentage of 
analyses showing a TSM analysis. The abscissa contains the number of analyses in  the study as a 
whole. The analysis number moves from left to right ( 1 990-2005) .  The trend l ine superimposed on 
the graph has an / = 0.45, l-obs = 1 9. 33 ,  which is statistical ly significant to a level of p = 0.0 I .  
1 7 7 .  See. e.g , In re Dembiczak, 1 75 F .3d 994, 1 00 I ( Fed. C ir. 1 999)  (holding that the Board 
did not make the required particular findings regarding the "locus of the suggestion, teaching, or 
motivation to combine the prior art references"); In re Rouffet, 1 49 F . 3d  1 3 50, 1 359  (Fed. Cir. 
1 99 8 )  ( stating that the Board must specifically identify the reasons "one of ordinary skill in the art 
would have been motivated to select the references and combine them to render the claimed 
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has to some degree characterized the TSM test as an easy means to avoid an 
obvious outcome. 1 78 Whatever the reason(s), however, the results show that 
the frequency of obvious outcomes remained stable even in the face of a sig­
nificantly increasing use of TSM. 1 79 
Although the results discussed above suggest that TSM has l ittle impact 
on the overall frequency of obvious outcomes, we questioned whether the 
increase in the rate of TSM shown in F igure 6 corresponded to an increase in 
nonobvious outcomes. If TSM is a "green l ight" to nonobviousness, perhaps 
some of the vacated outcomes were converted to nonobvious outcomes by 
the increasing application of TSM. Figure 7 shows the rate of a nonobvious 
result when TSM applies.  
Figure 7: Rate of Nonobviousness Results in Analyses Applying TSM 1 80 
Rate of Nonobvious Results, When TSM Applies 
Obti<>u�.t�<>S A1>0ly>« at the fedttd (ircu.t. 1 990 -1005 
I =B.n�.�"""� 3 · ll1 i 
What we found was quite surpnsmg. The more TSM was used, the 
lower the rate of non obvious results .  This finding suggests that TSM is not a 
invention obvious") ;  Ashland Oil, Inc . v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc . ,  776 F .2d 2 8 1 , 297 ( Fed. 
C ir. 1 98 5 )  (holding that the district court 's  conclusion of obviousness was incorrect because it "did 
not elucidate any factual teachings, suggestions or incentives from this prior art that showed the 
propriety of combination"). 
1 78.  See supra notes 69-7 1 and accompanying text. 
1 79.  Compare supra Table 3, with supra Table 6 ( showing that the frequency of obvious 
outcomes is substantially similar between those analyses that mcluded TSM and those that did not ) .  
1 80. Here, the ordinate represents a twenty-analysis lagged average of the percentage of 
analyses showing a TSM analysis that produced a nonobvious result. The abscissa contains the 
number of analyses in the study that applied TSM.  The analysis number moves from left to nght 
( 1 990-2005). The trend line superimposed on the graph has an / = 0. 1 9, r-obs = 6 . 50, which is 
statistically significant to a level of p = 0.0 l .  
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great impediment to establishing obviousness. To the contrary, the more 
TSM appeared in Federal Circuit analyses, the less l ikely it was that the out­
come of the analysis was nonobvious.  This lends weight to the notion that 
TSM might be bringing a c larity to the law of obviousness that is helping 
rather than hindering the demonstration of obviousness .  It also indicates that 
TSM is not a lever or tool that the Federal C ircuit uses s imply to be pro­
patentee or to reach a nonobvious outcome . 
The TSM results may also suggest that the Federal C ircuit i s  playing the 
role of the enforcer. The increase in the frequency of TSM analysis may re­
flect that litigants have been applying pressure to the doctrine by rais ing it 
frequently. 1 8 1  As noted above, 1 82 this may reflect some uncertainty about the 
doctrine. The observed increase in writing on the part of the Federal Circuit 
may indicate that the court has moved to address the stress that a perceived 
or real lack of clarity may have p laced on the doctrine. It may also be con­
firming evidence of the elevation of the doctrine to the position of a core 
consideration in the obviousness determination. The fact that as the appear­
ance of TSM increased fewer cases had a nonobvious outcome suggests that 
what the Federal Circuit has been teaching is that TSM i s  not a "green l ight" 
to a nonobvious outcome. In fact, as discussed above, it may show exactly 
the opposite. 
Consistent with thi s  line of thinking, the results of this study appear to 
suggest that TSM has not brought great inflexibi lity or rigidity .  As seen be­
low in F igure 8, the court appears to have broadened the use of sources 
valuable for establishing teaching, suggestion, or motivation. This trend-in 
view of the fact that as the application of TSM increased, the frequency of 
nonobvious outcomes decreased-may indicate that the court ' s  writing has 
been directed to explaining how to use the doctrine. Figure 8 suggests that 
what the com1 is teaching is the broad use of prior art information to estab­
l ish a teaching, suggestion, or motivation that makes apparent the claimed 
subject matter to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Thus, these data 
may reveal an evolving and dynamic doctrine that is responsive and 
functionally concerned with the concept underlying the obviousness inquiry. 
1 8 1 .  I t  is less l ikely that i t  reflects Federal C ircuit freelancing, as appellate courts do not 
generally involve themselves with issues and arguments not raised by the part ies .  
1 82 .  See supra Figure 3 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 8 :  Number of TSM Sources Shown in Federal C ircuit Opinions 
1.0 
" 
Teaching, 5uggeslion, Moli�ation Foaors Applied 
Ohr.o'""' Annlym ol lhe fodecnl GHo;l, 1 9?11 -?005 
r �fkl,.l\r.\� �·- � . �til 1 
a a-.�n-� J ""�l 
a ��.r-- " "'�"'t.� 
BOi.r 
i'Q -'0 &I 30 100 120 1411 H4 180 1((1 110 Z#i 1b0 110 300 320 �0 3&3 J.'30 400: .f21) HI) 4b0 48D 
!itUI�K11J. (n · 4!0) 
V. Implications and Conclusions 
While this study reveals a still-incomp lete p icture of the law of 
obviousness, it does permit several significant observations about how the 
Federal Circuit has developed the doctrine. Collectively, the results suggest 
that the court ' s  approach to patentabil ity is not systematically b iased against 
obviousness. They further suggest that much of the contemporary criticism 
of the evolution of the doctrine under the guidance of the Federal C ircuit may 
be exaggerated. As we discuss below, the evidence from this study under­
mines both the assumption that TSM is negatively affecting the patent 
jurisprudence and the assumption that removing TSM from the j urisprudence 
would provide relief from any perceived increase in the grant of noninnova­
tive patents. Moreover, the results suggest that TSM may be playing a 
positive role by showing litigants and lower tribunals how to establish 
obviousness. 
Among the results that stand out in this study are : 
1 .  The Federal Circuit affirmed the outcome of obviousness 
determinations a clear majority of the time. 
2 .  The Federal Circuit found claims obvious a clear majority of the 
time. 
3 .  The overall rate a t  which the Federal Circuit affirmed the P TO is 
nearly identical to the overall affirmance rate and is increasing. 
4 .  There has been a substantial increase in  the appearance of TSM 
analysis in Federal Circuit opinions. 
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5 .  A s  TSM analysis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at which the Federal Circuit affirmed or 
reversed the revievved tribunal has not substantially changed. 
6 . The frequency of an obvious or nonobvious outcome is not 
substantially dif erent in cases that include a TSM analysis and 
those that do not. 
7. As TSM ana(vsis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at vl "hich the Federal Circuit reached a 
nonobvious outcome has decreased. 
8 .  A s  TSM analysis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at which the court reversed the PTO has 
decreased. 
9 .  As TSM analysis has become more prominent in  Federal Circuit 
opinions, the court has shown on increase in the number of sources 
on which it relies to analyze TSM. 
A .  The Implications of This Study for the General Doctrinal  and Normative 
Policy-Shaping Contentions Surrounding KSR International 
The results of this study provide important information concerning the 
general doctrinal and political contentions involved in KSR International. 
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to realize that this study 
is not, and was not designed to be, highly probative of all of them. I n  
particular, these results do not reveal whether there are too many 
noninnovative patents. Indeed, to know the answer to that question requires 
knowing where the line between innovative and noninnovative is; only when 
that l ine is defined may one approach the question of whether there are too 
many noninnovative patents .  Congress has defined the line as "obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skil l  in the 
art ." 1 83 The Supreme Court defined the line with the Graham factors and the 
guidance that the statutory language "at the time the invention was made" 
should be assiduously observed. 1 84 I f the language the Federal Circuit uses is 
any guide to what it actually does, the Federal Circuit has stayed reasonably 
tme to this framework : adding-if indeed it is an addition-the requirement 
that somewhere within the full scope of the prior ati, whether in the prior art 
references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or 
from the nature of the problem to be sol ved, must be information that teaches 
or suggests the claimed subject matter to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art. 1 85 Assuming, arguendo, that with the TSM requirement the Federal 
Circuit has made a significant change to the doctrine in terms of the strictness 
1 83 .  35 U . S . C .  § 1 03 ( a )  ( 2000 ) .  
1 84 .  Graham v.  John Deere C o .  o f  Kan. C ity. 383 U . S .  l ,  1 5  ( 1 966 ) 
1 85 .  See In re Dembiczak. 1 7 5 F .3d  994. 999 ( Fed. Cir .  1 999)  ( l isting the above factors as those 
that are considered ). 
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Figure 8 :  Number of TSM Sources Shown in Federal Circuit Opinions 
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V. I mplications and Conclusions 
While this study reveals a still-incomplete p icture of the law of 
obviousness, it does permit several signi ficant observations about how the 
Federal Circuit has developed the doctrine. Collectively, the results suggest 
that the court ' s  approach to patentabi lity is not systematically biased against 
obviousness. They further suggest that much of the contemporary criticism 
of the evolution of the doctrine under the guidance of the Federal C ircuit may 
be exaggerated. As we discuss below, the evidence from this study under­
mines both the assumption that TSM is negatively affecting the patent 
j urisprudence and the assumption that removing TSM from the j urisprudence 
would provide relief from any perceived increase in the grant of noninnova­
tive patents. Moreover, the results suggest that TSM may be playing a 
positive role by showing litigants and lower tribunals how to establish 
obviousness . 
Among the results that stand out in this study are: 
1 .  The Federal Circuit af irmed the outcome of obviousness 
determinations a clear majority of the time. 
2 .  The Federal Circuit found claims obvious a clear majority of the 
time. 
3 .  The overall rate a t  which the Federal Circuit af irmed the PTO is 
nearly identical to the overall affirmance rate and is increasing. 
4 .  There has been a substantial increase in the appearance of TSM 
analysis in Federal Circuit opinions. 
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S .  A s  TSM ana�ysis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at �which the Federal Circuit af irmed or 
reversed the revievved tribuna! has not substantially changed. 
6 .  The frequency of an obvious o r  nonobvious outcome is not 
substantial(v different in cases that include a TSM analysis and 
those that do not. 
7 .  As TSM analysis has become more prominent in  Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at vt ·h ich the Federal Circuit reached a 
nonobvious outcome has decreased. 
8 .  As TSM analysis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the rate at vvh ich the court reversed the P TO has 
decreased. 
9 .  As TSM analysis has become more prominent in Federal Circuit 
opinions, the court has shown an increase in the number of sources 
on which it relies to analyze TSM. 
A .  The Implications of This Study for the General Doctrinal  and Normative 
Policy-Shaping Contentions Surrounding KSR International 
The results of this study provide important information concerning the 
general doctrinal and political contentions involved in KSR International. 
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to realize that this study 
is not, and was not designed to be, highly probative of al l  of them. In 
particular, these results do not reveal whether there are too many 
noninnovative patents . Indeed, to know the answer to that question requires 
knowing where the line between innovative and noninnovative i s ;  only when 
that line is defined may one approach the question of whether there are too 
many noninnovative patents. Congress has defined the line as "obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art ." 1 83 The Supreme Court defined the line with the Graham factors and the 
guidance that the statutory language "at the time the invention was made" 
should be assiduously observed. 1 84 I f  the language the Federal C ircuit uses is 
any guide to what it actually does, the Federal Circuit has stayed reasonably 
tme to this framework : adding-if indeed it is an addition-the requirement 
that somewhere within the full scope of the prior art, whether in the prior art 
references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill  in the art, or 
from the nature of the problem to be solved, must be information that teaches 
or suggests the claimed subj ect matter to a person having ordinary skil l  in the 
art . 1 85 Assuming, arguendo, that with the TSM requirement the Federal 
Circuit has made a significant change to the doctrine in terms of the strictness 
1 83 .  3 5  U.S.C. § 1 03 (a )  ( 2000 ) .  
1 84. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. Cit) . 383  U .S .  L 15  ( 1 966 )  
1 85 .  See In re Dembiczak. 1 75 F .3d  994. 999 ( Fed. C ir. 1 999)  ( l i sting the above factors as those 
that are considered) .  
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of the standard, this study was not qualitatively designed to answer the 
question of which most closely approximates what it means to be 
nonobvious. 
The results of this study do, however, reveal much concemmg the 
general issues of obviousness-related patentabi l ity that surround KSR 
International. 
TSM does not appear to present a "substantial obstacle" to establishing 
obviousness . Rather, it appears to have the flexibility to sustain obvious 
outcomes. If TSM is an "inflexible rule" that presents "substantial obstacles 
in establishing obviousness . . .  in a way that unnecessarily sustains patents 
that would otherwise be subject to inval idation as obvious," 1 86 the 
"inflexibility" of the rule should be apparent at the Federal C ircuit .  For the 
same reasons, the lower tribunal would be forced by the "rule" to enter a 
j udgment of nonobvious, so too would the Federal Circuit. The results from 
this study show that such is  not the case. This conclusion is shown by sev­
eral results. Overall ,  the Federal C ircuit reached an obvious outcome 
5 7 . 8%1 87 of the time. I n  cases involving TSM, the court reached an obvious 
outcome 5 2.4% 1 88 of the time. This difference is quantitatively small ,  
suggesting that there is no substantial difference in obvious outcomes when 
the court applies TSM. This further suggests that l itigants can make the 
showing necessary to establish obviousness. If TSM were inflexibly biased 
toward nonobviousness, it seems unlikely the court could sustain such high 
levels of obvious outcomes. 
I f  TSM is a pro-patentee doctrine that makes establishing 
nonobviousness easy, one would expect to see more of it in  the case law as 
patentees and patent applicants try to protect or obtain patents. This study 
does report an increase in the rate of TSM 1 89 over the last fifteen years, but it 
reveals a startling additional result: As the court ' s  use of TSM has increased, 
the l ikelihood of an analysis concluding that c laims were nonobvious has 
decreased. 1 90 This means that the increase in the use of T S M  has coincided 
with a reduced likelihood that patentees and patent appl icants will  leave the 
Federal Circuit with nonobvious patents or c laims. The fact that the more 
frequently the court applies TSM, the less likely it is to reach a nonobvious 
outcome further suggests that TSM does not present a substantial obstac le to 
estab lishing obviousness. 
TSM does not appear to present a "substantial obstacle" to the Patent 
Office when it comes to establ ishing that c laimed subject matter is obvious. 
During the course of this study, we examined the court ' s  review of the Patent 
Office, the body thought by many to be the most handicapped by the Federal 
1 86.  Brief for the U nited States, supra note 5, at 1 2 ,  1 1 - 1 2 .  
1 87 .  See supra Table 3 .  
1 88 .  See supra Table 6 .  
1 89.  See supra F igure 6 .  
1 90.  See supra Figure 7 .  
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Circuit ' s  TSM jurispmdence .  As the informed reader is aware, nearly every 
obviousness decision of the PTO that is reviewed by the Federal Circuit is a 
deci sion by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that the disputed 
claims are obvious. Here, the results show19 1  that the reversal rate for ap­
peals originating at the PTO declined over the same period during which the 
application of TSM was increasing . Perhaps the most direct inference from 
this is that the PTO is more accurately determining that claims are obvious or 
perhaps more accurately explaining how it reached the determination that 
claims are obvious. Either inference supports the idea that the Patent Office 
is capable of working in the framework of TSM. 1 92 In fact, one possible 
implication of the results i s  that the TSM formulation has been helping rather 
than handcuffing the Patent Office. As a question of framework dynamics, 
such a conclusion makes sense. Because TSM somewhat obj ectifies the test 
for obviousness, it creates a target at which the Patent Office can aim. It 
further provides a flexible and sweeping l inguistic formulation that the 
Office can use to characterize its findings on the question. The finding of 
TSM has been held by the court to be of a factual quality and, therefore, less 
prone to reversal. Thus, one interpretation of the results of this study is that 
the Federal Circuit has provided the Patent Office the road map to establish­
ing obviousness . A situation that, in cooperation with the deferential 
review1 93 the Office receives, has given the Patent Office the upper hand over 
undeserving patent applicants. 
If so, the same dynamic should be present in all cases where the court 
reviews lower courts that have similarly characterized factual findings on the 
question of obviousness. Thus, if the court has in fact explained to the lower 
courts how to establish obviousness, one would expect to see deference to the 
lower courts when they decide claims are obvious after making findings and 
1 9 1 .  See supra Figure 4.  
1 92 .  A critical reader should query whether the  increase in the application o f  ISM and the 
cOJTesponding decrease in non obvious results at the Federal Circuit is  a good measure of how well 
the Patent Office and lower courts are using ISM. For example, one might reasonably argue that 
the Federal Circuit's  doctrinal pronouncements influence the selection of cases that are appealed. I f  
s o ,  cases where a patent challenger cannot establish I S M  may b e  less l ikely  to be appealed o n  the 
issue of obviousness and thus would not show up in the results of this study. While such a situation 
could exist, however, it rel ies on some not-too-wel l -founded assumptions. One is  that the missing 
cases contain "obvious" subject matter that cannot be characterized as being taught or suggested by 
the prior art. It i s  at least equally l ikely that subject matter that cannot be characterized as taught or 
suggested by the prior art is  nonobvious. A second assumption is  that the Patent O ffice  and litigants 
are not interested enough in l itigating and appealing c laims they firmly believe to be obvious, where 
those claims might be difficult to put in terms of being taught or suggested by the prior art. 
If the Patent Office and l itigants are pull ing cases with obvious claims because they cannot 
characterize disputed claims as either taught or suggested by the prior art, the temporal aspect of 
this study might have revealed a tumble in either the frequency or rate of obviousness analyses. 
This was not seen. In fact, the frequency of the Federal Circuit obviousness analyses increased, 
albeit s l ightly, during the period of the study, and reversal rates remained stable for the entire 
fifteen-year period of the study. 
1 93 .  See In re Gartside, 203 FJd 1 305, 1 3 1 1 - 1 4  (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the substantial 
evidence standard of review to PTO findings of fact).  
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using or providing for a TSM characterization as the explanation for the 
outcome. The first of these conjunctives was observed. 1 94 The second was 
not directly tested, but enjoys some indirect support from the observation that 
the rate of use of TSM increased throughout the study. 
Although the Federal C ircuit ' s  TSM prescription appears more than 
flexible enough to sustain obviousness j udgments, it is stil l  worth considering 
the argument that the court virtual ly requires that the information that serves 
as the teaching, suggestion, or motivation be written in a prior art document. 
I t  should be noted that this is, of course, incorrect as a matter of law. 1 95 
However, we think there is a good faith argument behind the assertion : when 
fact finders must use TSM, they are practically unable to use it without a 
written prior art document containing the teaching. 
This is difficult to observe from the appellate level ,  but at least two 
things suggest that the argument may be overemphasized. The first is dis­
cussed above : lots of obvious outcomes are being reached at the Federal 
C ircuit when the court app lies TSM.  The second is both more subtle and 
more indirect. During the course of the study, the frequency with which the 
Federal Circuit used different sources to establish TSM increased. 1 96 This 
indicates that the panoply of prescribed sources are being used, and since at 
least two of them do not require a writing (e .g . ,  knowledge and skill of a per­
son having ordinary skil l  in the art, and the nature of the problem to be 
solved) , it is suggestive of a fairly far reaching test, one capab le  of exploring 
the ful l  scope of the relevant prior art. 
The results of this study do not support a normative argument that 
excising TSM from the doctrine without a more substantive change to the 
Graham approach or the governing statutory law will result in an increased 
number of obvious outcomes. 1 97 Many of the results supporting this finding 
have been described above : for the last fifteen years the Federal C ircuit has 
reached an obvious outcome at a fairly high rate ; over the last fifteen years, 
there has been only the slightest difference in obvious outcomes between 
cases that show the application of TSM and those that do not show the appl i ­
cation of TSM; as the Federal C ircuit uses TSM more frequently, the less 
likely it is to achieve an outcome of nonobvious; and as the Federal Circuit 
uses TSM more frequently, the less l ikely it is to reverse the PTO. Together 
these results suggest that TSM may not be the "green light" to nonobvious­
ness that has previously been supposed. I f  so, this finding impl ies that if 
1 94.  See supra Table 2 .  
1 95 .  See. e.g ,  In re Dembiczak, 1 75 F.3d 994, 9 9 9  ( Fed C ir. 1 99 9 )  ("We have noted that 
evidence of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine may flow from the prior art references 
themselves, the knowledge of one o f  ordinary skil l  in the art. or,  in some cases,  from the nature of 
the problem to be solved . . . " ) . 
1 96.  See supra Figure 8 .  
1 97 .  Given the nearly total scholarly focus on TSM, we have not in th is  Art ic le made an effort 
to describe and rule out other features of the law of obviousness that may differ between the 
Graham approach laid out so long ago and the contemporary doctrine. 
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there i s  a deleterious difference i n  substance between the framework the 
Supreme Court provided in Graham and the current doctrinal approach 
utilized by the Federal Circuit, we wil l  have to look elsewhere to find it. 
F inally, it suggests that those who take issue with the current level of 
innovation required to obtain a patent have a quarrel not with the Federal 
Circuit, but rather with Congress. 
B. Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? 
Here, as before, 1 98 we consider that question through the lens of the 
court ' s  mandate: establishing uniformity and predictab i l ity from the 
inconsistency and confusion that existed prior to FCIA.  While there is more 
to learn about the law of obviousness than can be reported in this Article, this 
study reveals several signs that the court is, if not succeeding, moving toward 
meeting its mandate. Those signs are found separately in observations con­
cerning doctrinal stabi l ity, doctrinal evolution, and doctrinal effect. 
The indicators of doctrinal stabi lity are several. The Federal C ircuit has 
a relatively low reversal rate on the question of obviousness that has re­
mained stable  for the last fifteen years. The court affirms the decision of 
lower tribunals at a ratio greater than three to one. Moreover, this rate of af­
firmance seems independent of  whether TSM is used by the court when 
analyzing obviousness. The court seems to have remained loyal to the fac­
tual nature of the doctrine.  Following a trial of any sort, the court is very 
l ikely to affirm and very unl ikely to reverse. As one would expect from the 
warden of a highly factual , functional determination, the Federal C ircuit fre­
quently rejects summary j udgment. Finally, the court has been surprisingly 
consistent across general technological identities, which may indicate an 
abi lity to evenly apply the doctrine to a variety of different techno-factual 
s ituations. 
Whether the doctrine is evolving to a p lace that is  c loser to or farther 
from stabil ity and predictabi lity is harder to tell .  Presently, there is at least 
room for optimism. Based on the increasing rate at which it appears in 
Federal C ircuit obvious analyses, there can be l ittle question that TSM is  
ascending in importance . However, contrary to  the common wisdom, TSM 
does not appear to  be  a green l ight to  a nonobvious outcome. There are sig­
nals in the results of this study, including decreasing nonobvious outcomes 
and decreasing reversal rates at the Patent Office, that may indicate that TSM 
is playing a different function. One possible function may be to take at least 
some of the guesswork out of obviousness decision making, both at the re­
viewed tribunal and on appellate review. If TSM has reduced the ambiguity 
in deciding obviousness and somewhat objectified the analysis, that might be 
a welcome improvement. Perhaps now the Patent Office and the lower 
courts have a l inguistic formulation with which to present their findings that 
198 .  Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7,  at 117 1. 
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the prior art makes obvious claimed subject matter, one that can be commu­
nicated to a jury or a reviewing court while  s imultaneously enjoying the 
protection of a high level of deference . 1 99 In addition, the increase in the rate 
of TSM analyses suggests that the Federal Circuit is teaching more about the 
doctrine . In l ight of the outcomes, reversal rates, and observations concern­
ing the number of sources used, what the court appears to be teaching is how 
to use the different sources to establish TSM. Perhaps, then, the court has 
done what Congress, and later the Supreme Court, could not: i t  has taken a 
very ambiguous and subjective doctrinal concept and made it more obj ective 
in a manner that shows some degree of sensitivity and fealty to its functional 
nature . If so, it would be a triumph not only for the Federal C ircuit, but also 
for the concept of institutional design it reflects. 
What can the Federal C ircuit do better? If  i t  intends for TSM to be a 
road map to obviousness,  it could be more open in saying so.  Thus far i t  
looks l ike the court i s  showing the breadth and power of the approach, and i s  
increas ingly doing so .  However, i t  has not, a s  far was we know, talked 
openly about its true potential . 
VI .  Conclusion and Future Directions 
Although the question cannot be completely answered in this Article, it 
appears that the Federal Circuit has developed a robust j urisprudence 
surrounding obviousness .  Given the ambiguity of the obviousness concept, 
the developed law appears fairly stable, predictab le, and procedurally certain. 
The results of this study further suggest that the court is staying atop this 
issue, writing more analyses containing TSM, and in its appl ication teaching 
that the test can be used to reject the assertion that claims are nonobvious. 
The results of this study also cast doubt on the validity of the assertion that 
the TSM test has paralyzed the obviousness inquiry to the point of 
uselessness. Indeed, some of the results reported in this Article suggest that 
the opposite is true. Nor does there appear to be a strong basis  to excise the 
TSM test from the law of obviousness, and even if i t  were to be done, there is  
l ittle basis for the expectation that more claims would be adjudicated obvious 
at any tribunal. 
The results presented here suggest numerous avenues for further study. 
For example,  it would be interesting to examine district court conduct in the 
context of TSM. Are district comis using it as the study suggests-as the 
bull ' s-eye of obviousness? How frequently does it appear in the opinions 
and judgments of lower tribunals? What outcomes are reached? What, i f  
any, are the historical patterns? Are litigants and lower courts di ligent when 
--·------ ----------------------
1 99 .  While the thought of TSM playing this role is appeal ing, it may also be troublesome 
because the Federal C ircuit may have handed over a significant amount of power to the Patent 
Office and lower courts. If it becomes too easy to establ ish obviousness, doctrinal clarity may begin 
to fade into a battle of the experts as the obviousness determinations are subsumed into ( relatively ) 
review-immune TSM determinations. 
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trying the issue? Do they attempt to present non documentary evidence of the 
knowledge of the PHOSIT A or the nature of the problem to be solved? How 
frequently is the question appealed? 
Does the Patent Office complain that its examiners cannot apply the 
TSM? While the results reported here would appear to suggest that the 
Office is capable of explaining how a person of skill in the art would find 
claimed subject matter taught or suggested by the prior art, is the task too 
difficult? If so, how might the standard be better tailored to assist the Office? 
Other avenues of investigation could be directed to obtaining a 
comprehensive measure of the number of "low-quality patents ."  How is a 
low-quality patent to be identified? What method(s) can be used to system­
atically identify actual or potential low-quality patents? Are the social harms 
that are argued to attend the large number of i ssued patents less than, greater 
than, or equal to the benefits of having a patent system? 
Under the assumption that there is indeed a problem with obviousness 
law-and that the problem is that it is too easy to get a patent-another ave­
nue of investigation could be some creative thinking on how to modify the 
patent law to better reflect the concept, while at the same time not damaging 
innovation in this country and preserving the justiciabil ity of the 
determination. 
V I I. Epilogue : The Supreme Court and the Modem Obviousness Standard 
While thi s  Article was in production, the Supreme Court heard 
argument and decided KSR International Co. v. Telejlex Inc. I n  its decision 
the Supreme Court-reentering the area of obviousness after a hiatus of 
thirty-one years-unanimously reversed a Federal Circuit decision that con­
cluded that further fact-finding was necessary to determine whether the 
patent claim in suit is  obvious.200 B ut while the outcome on the merits was 
widely anticipated by the bar, the substance of the Court ' s  opinion is a re­
markable surprise. 
KSR International was the first t ime that the Federal Circuit ' s  teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation test was addressed by the Supreme Court . As ar­
ticulated by the Federal Circuit, the TSM analysis requires that for a patent 
claim to be obvious, the prior art must include information or knowledge that 
shows how and why a claimed comb ination of preexisting elements would 
have been apparent to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.20 1  
When the case was argued in November of 2006, the Com1 expressed con­
tempt for the Federal Circui t ' s  development of the TSM standard. Several 
Justices repeatedly commented that they could not understand it ,202 and one 
200. Teleflex, Inc. v .  KSR lnt ' l  Co. ,  1 1 9 F. App 'x 282,  290 ( FeeL Cir. 2005 ) ,  rev 'd, 1 27 S. Ct .  
1 727  (2007 ) .  
20 I .  See supra section I I (  B ) ( 1 ) .  
202 . See. e.g. , Transcript of Oral Argument at 40,  KSR lnt 'l Co. ,  127 S.  Ct. 1 72 7  (No. 04- 1 350 )  
(calling the standard meaningless) .  
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Justice went so far as to call the standard "gobbledygook."203 I ndeed, the 
tone of the "colloquy" was so rough and so lopsided that i t  led seasoned 
Court observers to predict a unanimous repudiation of the TSM standard and 
along with it the last twenty-five years of Federal C ircuit jurisprudence . 
But the rhetoric expressed by the Court at oral argument is belied by the 
opinion that ultimately emerged in the case. For the legal standard the Court 
embraces is l ittle different from the TSM standard that the Federal Circuit 
has traditionally applied. B efore the Court ' s  decision in this case, the 
Federal Circuit j urisprudence held that c laims are obvious when information, 
knowledge, and skil l  in an art provided a teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
to combine prior art elements in the manner claimed in a patent. 204 After 
tracing this "helpful insight" back forty-six years to a predecessor court to 
the Federal Circuit,205 the Supreme Court affirmed its basic principle,  holding 
that predictable (and therefore obvious) extensions of prior art or arrange­
ments of prior art elements are identifiab le by considering "whether there 
was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion 
c laimed by the patent at issue."206 
Likewise, the Federal Circuit has traditional ly encouraged the broad use 
of prior art information to test whether c laims are obvious, i . e . ,  from prior art 
references, the knowledge and skil l  of the ordinary artisan, or from the nature 
of the problem to be solved.207 In its opinion, the Supreme Court embraced 
this practice, stating that an obviousness inquiry should consider the interre­
lated teachings of multiple  patents, the knowledge and skil l  of the ordinary 
artisan, and the demands of the marketplace or design community.208 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that this flexibility in reviewing the context 
of an invention was a key element of the obviousness analysis .  
Also importantly, the Supreme Court now puts its weight behind the 
Federal Circuit ' s  traditional view that a decision maker must provide an 
explanation for how a combination of the prior art renders the patent claim at 
issue obvious.209 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, " [t ]o facilitate 
review, the analysis should be made explicit ."2 1 °  Finally, confirming the 
basic legal standard implemented by the Federal Circuit for more than two 
decades, the Court expressly rej ected the primary argument opponents to the 
standard have long voiced-that the basis of the TSM analysis is  somehow 
203 . See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 202, at 41 ("[The TSM analysis] is 
gobbledygook. I t  really is ,  i t ' s  irrational . " ) .  
204. See supra section II(B ) (  l ) .  
205 .  KSR lnr ' I  Co , 1 2 7  S .  Ct .  at 1 74 1 .  
206. !d. 
207.  See supra Figure 8.  
208 .  KSR lnt ' I  Co , 1 27 S .  Ct. at 1 740-4 1 .  
209. See supra section l l (B)( l  ) .  
2 1 0.  KSR lnt 'I Co , 1 2 7  S .  Ct. at 1 74 1  (citing In re Kahn, 44 1 F .3d 977,  988 ( Fed. Cir. 2006)) .  
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inconsistent with the guidance the Court long ago provided in Graham v. 
John Deere.
2 1 1  
Although the Court in KSR International gives its imprimatur to the 
principle of TSM, it does see error in the Federal Circuit ' s  opinion in the 
actual case at hand. In particular, the Court sees in the Federal Circuit ' s  
analysis a too-rigid application of the test. Note, however, that i n  the context 
of the Federal Circuit ' s  KSR International opinion, this is quite 
unremarkable .  The designation of the opinion as nonprecedential suggests 
that it was directed to the parties in the context of the specific case. 2 1 2  Thus, 
one would not expect it to contain a ful l ,  nuanced exposition of the law of 
obviousness, nor would one expect much of an application of the doctrine 
beyond that strictly required by the pat1icular factual and legal context of the 
case. In a j urispmdential sense, however, this approach-generally uphold­
ing the basis of the TSM approach, while condemning its application in this 
case-allows the Court to emphasize its most critical advice regarding the 
law of obviousness.  Namely, when a decision maker examines the content 
and teachings of the prior art for information or knowledge that shows how 
and why a c laimed combination would have been apparent to a person hav­
ing ordinary skill in the relevant art, the court should endeavor to remain 
flexible in its approach. A decision on the question of obviousness, notes the 
Court, should reflect both an effort to maintain a l iberal view of sources of 
information relevant to an obviousness analysis, as well as a searching con­
sideration of how prior art information may be understood and appl ied by a 
person of ordinary skill in the art. As stated by the Court : 
The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic 
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by 
overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit 
content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of 
modem technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this 
2 1 3  way. 
Finally, we note that in many ways, the Supreme Court ' s  opinion in 
KSR International raises as many questions as it answers. We point out a 
few below. 
Doctrinal Questions. How, if at all, must the Federal Circuit ' s  TSM 
analysis jurispmdence change to reflect the new teachings? In our view, the 
TSM analysis emerges from KSR International largely intact, as long as it is 
applied in ways that maintain flexibil ity. This suggests that it is unlikely that 
the Federal C ircuit will seek to make any s ignificant doctrinal change. 
------- · · --
2 1 1 .  See KSR !nr 'I Co. , 1 27 S .  Ct. at 1 74 1  ("There is no necessary inconsistency between the 
idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis .") .  
2 1 2 . See FED.  CIR. R. APP. P. 47.6( b )  ( indicating that opinions designated as nonprecedential 
may not be cited as precedent by parties other than for purposes of estoppel or law of the case) . 
2 1 3 .  KSR lnt 'l Co. ,  1 27 S .  Ct. at 1 74 1 .  
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The Supreme Court and Patent Policy. I s  the Supreme Court moving 
toward a more hands-off approach in its use of policy to shape patent law? A 
number of the Court ' s  recent opinions are notable for including in their 
analysis broad discussions of patent policy.2 1 4  In contrast, the KSR 
International opinion is  bereft of the broad policy discussions that have 
animated other recent patent decisions . Moreover, the opinion fai ls  to 
meaningfully address the important concern of hindsight bias (a critical issue 
in obviousness analysis). Does this suggest a step back by the Court from its 
recent foray into shaping the patent law? Has the Court decided that patent 
policy is either too difficult or too intractable to serve as an effective analyti­
cal tool for the most significant patent i ssues? At present, it is too early to 
tell ,  but the absence of any substantial discussion of patent pol icy in the KSR 
International opinion does raise this question. 
Decision Making by the Supreme Court. How did the Court move from 
viewing the TSM standard as "gobbledygook" to declaring it a "helpful 
insight?" The answer wil l  probably never be completely c lear. One view, 
consistent with the analysis in this Article, is that the promises made in the 
rhetoric leading up to the case were simply not fulfilled when the Court took 
a close look at the law. That is, notwithstanding overbroad statements con­
cerning the rigidity of the Federal C ircuit ' s  doctrine and a causal link 
between the TSM analysis and low-patent quality, the facts simp ly did not 
support the claims. This view is  also consi stent with other contemporaneous 
articles analyzing the Federal C ircuit ' s  obviousness law,2 1 5  and was a point 
forcefully made by several academics2 1 6  and pursued by advocates before the 
Court in the run-up to the KSR International decision. 2 1 7 
The ultimate influence of the Supreme Court ' s  opinion on the law of  
obviousness wi l l  need to  await future interpretations and app l ications by the 
Federal Circuit. On its face, however, the opinion preserves the core 
2 1 4. See, e.g ,  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. ,  5 3 5  U . S .  722 (2002 ) ;  
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc . ,  5 1 7  U.S .  370 ( 1 996) .  
2 1 5 .  See Christopher A .  Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An  Empirical 
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 9 1 1 ,  952-53 (2007) ( summarizing findings 
that "should, at the very least, give pause to recent calls to modify or do away with the suggestion 
test and the Federal Circuit ' s  recent nonobviousness jurisprudence"); Gregory M andel, Patently 
Non-Obvious II· Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v.  
Teleflex, 9 YALE J . L .  & TECH .  1 ,  3 8  (2007)  ("The study reported here, however, reveals that even i f  
the non-obvious standard is too low, i t  is not because of the Federal Circuit ' s  suggestion test. The 
suggestion requirement simply does not appear to reduce the likelihood of an invention being held 
obvious.") .  
2 1 6. Brief of Business and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 2 ,  
KSR Int 'l Co , 1 27 S .  Ct .  1 727  (No .  04- 1 350)  ("We conclude that while the analysis i s  imperfect, 
and aspects of the Court of Appeals '  caselaw should be c larified, [the TSM] approach provides the 
best available analytic framework for implementing the statutory and constitutional goals of the 
nonobviousness requirement .") .  
2 1 7 . See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 202.  at 36  ("[T]he Federal C ircuit has made 
quite c lear that its test is inclusive, and we think that that establ ishes that it ' s not necessary to add 
some new sort of undetermined test . . . .  ") . 
2007] The Federal Circuit and Patentabil ity 2 1 07 
principle that already guides the Federal Circuit ' s  case law. Moreover, the 
interim guidance from the Patent Office appears to take the same view.2 1 8  
Thus, while the Court ' s  KSR International opinion may well muddy the wa­
ters of patentability for a t ime as the early obviousness cases work their way 
through the Federal Circuit, we do not expect that the case will work a 
serious upset to the settled expectations of the innovation community in the 
United States. 
2 1 8 . See Memorandum from the United States Patent and Trademark Office on KSR lnt 'l Co. 1·. 
Telejlex Inc. ( May 3, 2007),  available at http:l/app .onlinequickblog.com/fi les/80059-70098/ 
Focarino.pdf (noting that the Court did not reject the TSM test outright, but rather only rejected its 
rigid application) .  
2 1 08 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85 : 205 1 
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